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Abstract
The phrase “fishing expedition” is widely used in popular culture and in the law.  In the 
case of metaphorical “fishing” in the law, reliance on the metaphor can act as a substitute for 
rigorous analysis, disguising the factors that influence a result.  When used by the court, it is 
uninformative.  Worse, the fishing metaphor may itself shape the way the court thinks about the 
kind of issue or claim involved.  Accusations of “fishing” also affect the language and position 
of the litigants.  Parties arguing against pleadings or discovery use the metaphor as a rhetorical 
weapon, stigmatizing their opponents, instead of addressing and proving the merits of their 
objections to the cost of discovery.
This article begins by tracing the development of the fishing expedition metaphor in civil 
cases, demonstrating the way its changing uses reflect and contribute to the legal controversies of 
each era.  For most of its life, the metaphor has been used to condemn “fishing.”  During the 
period of the New Deal, and for several years afterward, “fishing” was acceptable. Recent cases, 
however, have gone back to a more skeptical view of certain types of discovery and litigation, so 
cases decrying “fishing expeditions” have returned with a vengeance.
Part II of this article examines the impact of the fishing metaphor.  Calling something a 
“fishing expedition” makes the court’s decision sound easy and obvious.  Facile use of the 
metaphor can thereby obscure the policy tradeoffs underlying decisions about pleadings and 
discovery. In an overwhelming proportion of modern cases, it is plaintiffs who are said to be 
“fishing,” and the metaphor’s concentration in certain kinds of cases reflects and reinforces a 
kind of anti-plaintiff bias.  The article concludes by suggesting that we reject the fishing 
metaphor.  It has been trite for more than two hundred years. It leads to mangled thoughts like 
“the trial court [should not] allow plaintiffs to embark on a wide-ranging fishing expedition in 
hopes that there may be gold out there somewhere.”  More important, the “fishing” metaphor can 
provide cover for rulings that if fully explained would be seen to violate the letter or spirit of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
3JUST SAY “NO FISHING”:
THE LURE OF METAPHOR
• “No longer can the time-honored cry of ‘fishing expedition’ serve to preclude a party from inquiring into 
the facts underlying the opponent’s case.” (1947)1
• “Plaintiffs may not conduct a fishing expedition.” (2002)2
Someone speaking to the news media declares an inquiry to be a “fishing expedition” just 
about every day.”3  This legal metaphor has become a cultural cliché, so often repeated that 
many people no longer recognize it as a metaphor at all.  It nevertheless remains a staple of 
judicial opinions that condemn a discovery request or a lawsuit as a “fishing expedition.”  In 
civil cases, the fishing metaphor is far from new; it dates at least as far back as the eighteenth 
century.4  Through years of procedural change, the metaphor clings tenaciously to legal 
discourse.  Its meaning has changed, and the policy behind it has changed, but it has stood as an 
iconic symbol of ‘now you’ve gone too far’ for more than two hundred and fifty years.  
This would be interesting, but not important, if metaphors were merely pretty figures of 
speech.  Metaphors, however, are far more fundamental; they influence the way people think.5
1 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947).
2 In re Ski Train Fire, 230 F. Supp. 2d 392, 400 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
3See, e.g., Louis P. Sheldon, Judge John Roberts Deserves Up or Down Vote in Senate, 
Traditional Values Coalition Press Release, July 26, 2005, at
http://www.traditionalvalues.org/print.php?sid=2358; Reuters, Librarians Assail Record ‘Fishing 
Expeditions’, MSNBC News, June 21, 2005, available at http://msnbc.msn.com/id/8304018.
4Buden v. Dore, 28 Eng. Rep. 284  (Ch. 1752).
5GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY 3 (1980); HAIG 
BOSMAJIAN, METAPHOR AND REASON IN JUDICIAL OPINIONS 38 (1992); SUSAN SONTAG, AIDS 
AND ITS METAPHORS 5 (1988) (“Of course, one cannot think without metaphors.”); Linda L. 
Berger, What Is the Sound of a Corporation Speaking? How Cognitive Theory of Metaphor Can 
Help Lawyers Shape the Law, 2 J. ASSOC. LEGAL WRITING DIR. 169, 170 (2004) (“In cognitive 
theory, metaphor is not only a way of seeing or saying; it is a way of thinking and knowing, the 
method by which we structure and reason, and it is fundamental, not ornamental.”)
4Legal language and thought, not surprisingly, are full of metaphors: lawyers speak of a “wall of 
separation” between church and state; of litigants having “standing”; of a “marketplace of ideas.”  
Lawyers live in a world in which “liens float, corporations reside, minds hold meetings, and 
promises run with the land.”6  Such metaphors help to illuminate the nature of abstract legal 
concepts by associating them with something more familiar and concrete, but they also shape the 
way we think about those concepts.7  For example, the war and sports metaphors used to describe 
the adversary system emphasize the competitive win-lose aspect of litigation and hide the 
opportunities for cooperation.8  The metaphor that treats a corporation as a “person” makes it
easier to accord it attorney-client privilege, and to look for its “nerve center.”9  When a metaphor 
comes to dominate the discussion of an area of law, it structures the way we perceive reality.10
As Lord Mansfield wrote, “nothing in law is so apt to mislead as a metaphor.”11
In the case of “fishing,” reliance on the metaphor can act as a substitute for rigorous 
analysis, disguising the factors that influence a result.  When used by the court, it is 
6Thomas Ross, Metaphor and Paradox, 23 GA. L. REV. 1053, 1053 (1989).
7Bernard J. Hibbits, Making Sense of Metaphors: Visuality, Orality, and the 
Reconfiguration of American Legal Discourse, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 226, 234 (1994).
8Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Metaphors Matter: How Images of Battle, Sports and Sex 
Shape the Adversary System, 10 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 225 (1995).
9Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 83 (1981) (corporate person); Teal Energy USA, 
Inc. v. GT, Inc., 369 F.3d 873, 876 (5th Cir. 2004) (nerve center).
10GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK TURNER, MORE THAN COOL REASON: A FIELD GUIDE TO 
POETIC METAPHORS 63 (1989).  “Anything we rely on constantly, unconsciously, and 
automatically is so much part of us that it cannot be easily resisted, in large measure because it is 
barely even noticed.  To the extent that we use a . . . conceptual metaphor, we accept its validity.  
Consequently, when someone else uses it, we are predisposed to accept its validity.  For this 
reason, conventionalized . . . metaphors have persuasive power over us.”
11Knox v. Gye, 5 L.R.-E. & I. App. 656, 676 (H.L. 1871) (attributing error in a case to the 
metaphoric use of the word “trustee”).  See also Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 445 (1962) (“the 
Court’s task is not responsibly aided by the uncritical invocation of metaphors like the ‘wall of 
separation.’”) (Stewart, J.).
5uninformative.  Worse, the fishing metaphor may itself shape the way the court thinks about the 
kind of issue or claim involved.  Accusations of “fishing” also affect the language and position 
of the litigants.  Parties arguing against pleadings or discovery use the metaphor as a rhetorical 
weapon, stigmatizing their opponents, instead of addressing and proving the merits of burden, or 
harassment, or cost.
This article traces the development of the fishing expedition metaphor in civil cases, 
demonstrating the way its changing uses reflect and contribute to the legal controversies of each
era.12  After surveying the use of fishing as a metaphor in culture generally, part I examines the 
shifting legal uses of the “fishing” label in six time periods: (1) in eighteenth century England; 
(2) in the pre-Civil War U.S.; (3) in the U.S. shortly before the advent of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure; (4) during the drafting of the Rules; (5) during the early implementation of the 
Rules; and (6) in contemporary cases.  For most of its life, the metaphor has been used to 
condemn “fishing.”  During the period of the New Deal, and for several years afterward, 
“fishing” was acceptable.13  Recent cases, however, have gone back to a more skeptical view of 
certain types of discovery and litigation, so cases decrying “fishing expeditions” have returned 
with a vengeance.
Part II of this article examines the impact of the fishing metaphor.   Calling something a 
“fishing expedition” makes the court’s decision sound easy and obvious; the ‘no fishing’ sign 
purports to be encrusted with generations of accrued legal wisdom.  Facile use of the metaphor 
can thereby obscure the policy tradeoffs underlying decisions about pleadings and discovery. In 
12While the metaphor is also used in criminal cases, and in cases involving administrative 
subpoenas, they are beyond the scope of this article.
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“Fishing” may have had a more narrow technical meaning in this context than one 
6an overwhelming proportion of modern cases, it is plaintiffs who are said to be “fishing,” and the 
metaphor’s concentration in certain kinds of cases reflects a kind of anti-plaintiff bias.  The 
article concludes by suggesting that the legal profession reconsider and reject the fishing 
metaphor.  It has been trite for more than two hundred years.14  It leads to mangled thoughts like 
“the trial court [should not] allow plaintiffs to embark on a wide-ranging fishing expedition in 
hopes that there may be gold out there somewhere.”15  More important, the “fishing” metaphor 
can provide cover for rulings that if fully explained would be seen to violate the letter or spirit of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
I.  A History of the Fishing Metaphor
A. The Fishing Metaphor in its Non-Legal Context
Literally, “fishing” means going to some body of water to try to somehow catch the fish 
that live there.  The history of fishing goes back to ancient times, when people began fishing for 
food using bones as hooks and lengths of vine as line.16  Plato discussed fishing, noting that one 
could fish with nets, baskets, hooks, or spears.17  Sport fishing is documented in a late fifteenth 
would suppose, however.   See text accompanying notes – infra.
14Renison v. Ashley, 30 E.R. 724 (1794) (Loughborough, L.C.) (“This is another of the 
fishing bills, which I do not like to see in this Court.”) (emphasis added).
15Monarch Assurance P.L.C. v. United States, 244 F.3d 1356, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2001) 
(allowing limited further discovery regarding plaintiff’s claim that it loaned money to a secret
agent of the United States to support a clandestine CIA operation, but that it was never repaid).  
See also Report, Liability for Defective Products at the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century: 
Emergence of a Worldwide Standard?, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 751, 818 (2003) (“This allows a 
product liability plaintiff to go on a ‘fishing expedition’ in the defendant’s records in the mere 
hope of finding a ‘smoking gun.’”); Forthmann v. Boyer, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 715, 721 (Cal. App. 
2002) (“The trial court cannot be faulted for slamming the door on this transparent fishing 
expedition.”).
16Jay H. Cassell, History of Fishing, at 
http://www.activeangler.com/articles/beginners/articles/history/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2006).
17WILHELM H. WUELLNER, THE MEANING OF “FISHERS OF MEN” 13 (1967) (quoting THE 
7century treatise written by the prioress of an English abbey,18 and in 1653 Izaak Walton 
published his famous work, The Compleat Angler, or the Contemplative Man’s Recreation.  
Whether for food or for sport, “fishing” in culture has generally positive associations.  The 
phrase “fishing expedition,” typed into Google, will retrieve advertisements for companies 
offering to take people on exotic fishing expeditions.19  Literal references to fishing often have a 
sort of reverent quality, whether they come from journalists, philosophers, or presidents.  “If 
fishing is a religion, fly fishing is high church.”20 “Shall I go to heaven or a-fishing?”21  “Fishing 
is much more than fish. . . . It is the great occasion when we may return to the fine simplicity of 
our forefathers.”22  Further, fishing (at least at its best) is not a random, baseless toss of hook into 
water, but an activity requiring knowledge and hard work: “My father was very sure about 
certain matters pertaining to the universe.  To him all good things – trout as well as eternal 
salvation – come by grace, and grace comes by art, and art does not come easy.”23
How, then, did the metaphoric use of fishing come to be so negative?  It appears that 
from ancient times fishing was seen as having a potential dark side.  Oppian, the second century 
SOPHIST) (noting that some types of fishing were considered morally superior to others).
18DAME JULIANA BERNERS, A TREATYSE OF FYSSHYNGE WYTH AN ANGLE (1496) (cited in 
Cassell, supra note – ).
19See, e.g., Louisiana Fishing Expeditions, at http://louisiana-fishing-expeditions.com 
(last visited Feb. 2, 2006); Belize Flats Fishing Expeditions, at http://www.belizeflatsfishing.com 
(last visited Feb. 2, 2006).
20Tom Brokaw, INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, Sep. 10, 1991, reprinted in THE 
COLUMBIA WORLD OF QUOTATIONS (1996), available at
http://www.bartleby.com/66/47/8347.html.
21HENRY DAVID THOREAU, WALDEN (1854), reprinted in id., available at
http://www.bartleby.com/63/55/8855.html.
22Herbert Hoover, NEW YORK TIMES, August 9, 1964 (on the occasion of his 90th 
birthday), reprinted in SIMPSON’S CONTEMPORARY QUOTATIONS (1988), available at
http://www.bartleby.com/63/55/8855.html.
23NORMAN MACLEAN, A RIVER RUNS THROUGH IT 4 (1976) (“In our family, there was no 
8Greek poet, wrote of the “crafty devices of the cunning fisher’s art.”24  Ancient Near East 
literature distinguished between good and bad “fishers,” with undesirable fishing associated with 
images like the “net of Hades” or the “four evil fishers of men.”25  Writers in the Middle Ages 
continued to see a danger of sneaky indirection in metaphorical fishing.  The Middle English 
Dictionary defines “fishen” as: 
(a) To lure or win (souls); to catch as with bait or in a net, to hunt (for something); (b) to 
seek or find (an excuse, etc.). [Ex:] “Hem that . . . preche us povert and distresse, And 
fisshen hemsilf gret richesse With wily nettis that they caste” [and] “Anon thei can .. 
Fisshe and fynde out in their entencioun A couert cloude to shadwe ther tresoun.”26
Such metaphorical references to fishing continued in popular literature.  In Shakespeare’s 
Merchant of Venice, one character chides another for trying to pry speech from him by saying, 
“fish not.”27 In fact, by Shakespeare’s time the fishing metaphor was so well established that it 
could be employed without actually using the word “fishing.”  In Hamlet, for example, Polonius 
gives advice about how a man can “worm” out information about his son in Paris by making 
false statements.  Polonius says:
Your bait of falsehood takes this carp of truth:
And thus do we of wisdom and of reach,
With windlasses and with assays of bias,
By indirections find directions out28
clear line between religion and fly fishing.”  Id. at 1).
24OPPIAN, HALIEUTICA  (“On Fishing”), lines 7f (quoted in WUELLNER, supra note – at 
16).
25WUELLNER, supra note – at 64-88.
26MIDDLE ENGLISH DICTIONARY (HANS KURATH, ED.) 594 (1954) (quotes are from the 
early fifteenth century).
27WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICe, Act I, scene 1, line 101.  See also 
MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING, Act II, scene iii, line 100 (“Bait the hook well, this fish will bite.”).  
For a contemporary example, see SARA PARETSKY, FIRE SALE 289 (2005) (“You have nothing on 
me, not one goddamn thing.  You’re fishing without worms.”).
28 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, Act II, scene 1, lines 62-65.
9Samuel Richardson’s Pamela, written in 1741, has a character ask, “Why . . . is all this fishing 
about for something when there is nothing?”29  Small wonder, then, that the Oxford English 
Dictionary lists as a figurative meaning of fishing: “of an accusation, inquiry, etc.: Preferred or 
put forward in order to elicit information which cannot be gained directly.”30  It is the negative 
rather than the positive version of fishing that worked its way into legal thought.
B. The Fishing Metaphor in the Law
1. Eighteenth Century England and Bills of Discovery
a. The Courts
Historically, discovery was not permitted in common law actions.  At law, pleadings 
were a vehicle intended to prepare cases for trial by narrowing the issues, a process that involved 
lawyers characterizing the legal effect of allegations rather than revealing facts.31  Because the 
pleadings revealed so little information, litigants resorted to equity courts, which permitted an 
equitable bill of discovery.32 The bill of discovery was seen as a way to provide access to 
evidence that would not otherwise be available at trial.33  The plaintiff’s equity pleadings were 
required to be quite detailed,34 and the defendant was supposed to respond to the pleadings and 
29OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE, at http://dictionary.oed.com, last visited July 
26, 2005 (fishing, vbl. n (1)(c)).  In 1608, “to go fishing” could also mean “to rob on the 
highways.” Id. (“Soldiers, that have no means to thrive by plain dealing . . . go a-fishing on 
Salisbury Plain.”).  Id. (fishing vbl. n.(2)).
30Id. (fishing, ppl. a (2)).
31C. C. LANGDELL, A SUMMARY OF EQUITY PLEADING § 34, at 24-25 (1883); Fleming 
James, Jr., Discovery, 38 YALE L.J. 746, 746-47 (1929); GEORGE RAGLAND, JR., DISCOVERY 
BEFORE TRIAL 1-17 (1932).
32This practice dates back to at least the mid fifteenth century.  RAGLAND, supra note –
at 12.
33THOMAS HARE, A TREATISE ON DISCOVERY OF EVIDENCE BY BILL AND ANSWER IN 
EQUITY vii-viii (1836).
34RAGLAND, supra note – at 6 (“Pleadings were supposed to present the facts of the case 
10
attached questions.35  As equity jurisdiction developed, interrogatories came to assume a separate 
status from the pleadings, but they still required the same kind of factual specificity as equity 
pleadings.36
There were a number of limitations on the kind of information that could be acquired 
through an equitable bill of discovery.  The bill could be filed only against parties, not “mere 
witnesses.”37  It could not seek information that would incriminate the interrogated party.38  And 
a party could be required to disclose “facts” but not “evidence.”39  Documents could not be 
discovered unless the discovering party described the document with particularity and the 
interrogated party admitted to having the document.40  Nevertheless, the bill of discovery was far 
superior to the limited utility of the bill of particulars in the action at law.41
Cases regarding bills of discovery are the first civil cases in which I have been able to 
find the fishing metaphor.  The earliest ones involve disputes about ownership of real property.  
in so complete a fashion that the court would be able to render its decision thereon.”).
35Id. at 15.
36Id. at 16; J AMES, supra note – at 747.  See also Robert Wyness Millar, The Mechanism 
of Fact-Discovery: A Study in Comparative Civil Procedure, 32 ILL. L. REV. 424, 437-42 (1937-
38) (tracing development of discovery in chancery pleadings).
37EDWARD BRAY, THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF DISCOVERY 39 (1885), reprinted in
1985 by Legal Books Pty, Sydney).  Discovery was needed to get evidence from parties, because 
parties were not allowed to testify at trial at this time, based on a belief that their bias made them 
unreliable witnesses.  Non-party witnesses, on the other hand, could testify.
38Id. at 104.  Because of the early overlap between criminal and tort liability, there was 
“some doubt as to the extent to which a court of equity would interfere to give discovery in aid 
either of the prosecution of or the defense to actions for tort.”  Id. at 346-47.
39Id. at 444-48.
40Id. at 151-53.
41Edson Sunderland, Scope and Method of Discovery Before Trial, 42 YALE L.J. 863, 865 
(1933) (arguing that the bill of particulars fell short of forcing real disclosure of evidence and 
was a “feeble and restricted” contribution to discovery).
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In the first, Buden v. Dore,42 the plaintiff claimed title to land.  The defendant relied on a title 
inconsistent with the plaintiff’s.  The plaintiff complained that the defendant’s answer did not set 
out the deeds and writings that the defendant relied on to prove his title.  The Lord Chancellor 
ruled that the defendant did not have to disclose them, saying “you cannot come by a fishing bill 
in this court, and pray a discovery of the deeds and writings of defendant’s title.”  If, on the other 
hand, the defendant had in his possession deeds and writings showing the plaintiff’s title, those 
would have had to be disclosed.43  The label “fishing bill” thus represented what came to be 
known as the “own case” rule – a party could get discovery of information that would support his 
own case, but not information that would support his opponent’s case.44
“Fishing bill” continued to appear in land title disputes.  In Renison v. Ashley,45 the 
plaintiffs were the great-grand-daughters of one John Izzard, and they claimed to have inherited 
certain of his properties.  They brought suit against the woman in possession of that property, the 
step-daughter of one of their deceased cousins.  The plaintiffs sought to discover the deeds and 
other documents under which the step-daughter claimed title.  She offered to produce a deed 
showing her own title, but denied having any documents that would show the plaintiffs’ title.  
The Lord Chancellor declined to order pretrial production.  “This is another of the fishing bills, 
that I do not like to see in this Court.  A spirit of prying into titles has got into the Court, that is 
highly dangerous to the title of every man in England.”46
4228 Eng. Rep. 284 (Ch. 1752) (Hardwicke, L.C.).
43Id. at 284.
44See also JULIUS BYRON LEVINE, DISCOVERY: A COMPARISON BETWEEN ENGLISH AND 
AMERICAN CIVIL DISCOVERY LAW WITH REFORM PROPOSALS 76 and 141 n.14 (1982) (arguing 
that the “fishing” objection is synonymous with the “own case” rule).
4530 Eng. Rep. 724 (1794)(Loughborough, L.C.).
4630 Eng. Rep. at 724.
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The next year brought another condemnation of a “fishing bill,” again enforcing the “own 
case” limitation on discovery.  In Ivy v. Kekewick,47 the plaintiff claimed title to an estate by 
descent from the mother (ex parte materna) and that there was no heir from the father (ex parte 
paterna).  The defendant, on the other hand, claimed title by descent from the father.  The 
plaintiff prayed that the defendant “might set forth, in what manner he is heir ex parte paterna, 
and all the particulars of the pedigree, and the times and places or particulars of the births, 
baptisms, marriages, deaths or burials, of all the persons who shall be therein named.”  The Lord 
Chancellor firmly rejected this request for pre-trial disclosure:  “This is a fishing bill to know, 
how a man makes out his title as heir.  He is to make it out: but he has no business to tell the 
Plaintiff, how he is to make it out.”48
Other “fishing bill” cases show that discovery opponents were already using the “fishing” 
label to fight discovery.  For example, Ryves v. Ryves49 was a title dispute between the son of a 
first marriage and his step-mother and half brother.  His bill alleged the sources of his title and 
the extent of his estate.  He prayed that the defendants “be compelled to produce all such 
settlements, deeds, indentures, wills, instruments, and writings, or such settlement, deed, &c., as 
they or either of them may have in their, his or her, custody or power.”  The defendants argued in 
opposition to the request that “this is one of those vexatious fishing bills, which have always 
received the disapprobation of the Court.”50
To a certain extent, the cases also protect the lawyer’s privacy in trial preparation – hence 
Ivy’s insistence that the defendant’s evidence was not subject to pretrial discovery and the 
4730 Eng. Rep. 839 (1795)(Loughborough, L.C.).
48Id.
4930 Eng. Rep. 1044 (1797).
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defendant need not “tell the Plaintiff, how he is to make [his case] out.”51  Another early case 
rejected an interrogatory asking “[w]hat case do you intend to set up at the trial of this action as 
entitling you to recover against the defendants herein?” as improper because “a party is not to 
make a fishing application as to the manner in which his adversary intends to shape his case, and 
as to the evidence by which he intends to support it.”52
b. The Commentators
Early treatises reflecting on this case law note the fishing metaphor as a limit on the bill 
of discovery.  In 1836, Story reported that
no discovery will be compelled, except of facts material to the case stated by the plaintiff; 
for otherwise, he might file a bill, and insist upon a knowledge of facts wholly 
impertinent to his case . . .   In such a case his bill would most aptly be denominated a 
mere fishing bill.53
An influential nineteenth century treatise on discovery identifies “fishing actions” primarily with 
these land title fights.  It also suggests that the condemnation of “fishing” rests on concerns about 
invasion of privacy, the sanctity of property, and a concern that parties suing those in possession 
may have improper motives:
Allusion has already . . . been made to fishing actions . . . It is mainly in connection with 
the title to land that actions of this kind have been instituted.  So great is the temptation to 
a person with some fancied claim to another person’s land to get an opportunity of 
ransacking his title deeds in the hope of discovering some defect in the title that the most 
shadowy cases have frequently been launched with the view of finding out something 
about the title through the machinery of discovery.54
50Id. at 1046.
51Ivy, 30 E.R. at 839.
52Edwards v. Wakefield, 199 E.R. 937 (QB 1856).
53 2 JOSEPH STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, AS ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND 
AMERICA § 1497, at 712 (1836).
54BRAY, supra note – at 516.  Bray notes that the “mischief of the exposure of documents 
of title extends beyond the particular action: for though the title might not be defective as against 
the particular adversary in the action, the documents might reveal defects of which other persons 
14
While it might seem strange to us now to think of property records as private, England did not 
have a general public title registration system until the twentieth century.  Deeds and other 
documents reflecting title were “handed from purchaser to purchaser and were usually kept in 
boxes in the office of the owner’s solicitor.”55 Disputes of this kind could also have the effect of 
airing the family’s secrets.  
2. Pre-Civil War U.S. Cases
a. The Courts
The fishing metaphor traveled to the United States with the common law.56  Its earliest 
expression in this country came in collection cases, usually suits on notes or attempts by 
creditors to reach assets through an allegation of a fraudulent conveyance.57  Discovery was still 
might take advantage.”  Id.  He cites Buden, Renison, and Ryves to support his observation that 
in “early times the judges frequently expressed their strong disapprobation of actions of a fishing 
character.”  Id. at 517.  See also HARE, supra note – at 184-85.
55JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES KRIER, PROPERTY 687-88 (3d ed. 1993).
56The metaphor is alive and well in other common law countries, too.  See, e.g., 
ARCHIBALD MACSPORRAN & ANDREW R.W. YOUNG, COMMISSION AND DILIGENCE 53 (1995) 
(“Indeed, it is seldom that the courts hear an opposed motion for commission and diligence in 
which the phrase [‘fishing diligence’] does not feature.”)(Scotland); DAVID STOCKWOOD, CIVIL 
LITIGATION 71 (4th ed. 1997)(regarding production of documents from non-parties: “The courts 
will not allow the rule to be used to permit a ‘fishing expedition’.”)(Canada); B.C. CAIRNS, 
AUSTRALIAN CIVIL PROCEDURE (5th ed. 2002)(“A fishing interrogatory inquires after a cause of 
action or defence not pleaded in the hope of discovering something that can then be alleged as a 
claim or defence.  It is an attempt to drag a party’s files to seek out what is there without any 
ground for believing that they contain relevant information.”)(Australia).  Other countries may 
have a concept of limits on discovery, but it seems to be metaphor free.  See, e.g., KUO-CHANG 
HUANG, INTRODUCING DISCOVERY INTO CIVIL Law 48 n.32 (2003) (“The principle of the 
prohibition of probing, Verbot des Ausforschungsbeweises, in German, is clearly established 
under German civil procedure.”)
57English bill of discovery cases also began expanding into cases involving creditors.  
See, e.g., Lush v. Wilkinson, 34 Eng. Rep. 899 (Ch. 1800)(Lord Alvaney, Master of the Rolls) 
(“It is very extraordinary for a subsequent creditor to come with a fishing bill, in order to prove 
antecedent debts.”)
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governed by the limits in the equity rules.58  These cases identify “fishing” with the “own case” 
rule, and they also began to criticize a perceived speculation in the plaintiffs’ requests.  In these 
cases, the limits on discovery are closely intertwined with requirements for particularized 
pleadings.
The earliest case is Newkirk v. Willett,59 in which a widow filed a bill of discovery against 
a creditor who had sued her in a law court for money the creditor claimed that her late husband 
had owed.  The widow said she had no personal knowledge of the debt, and believed it to be 
unjust because the creditor had never tried to collect his claim during her husband’s lifetime and 
he did not have written proof of the debt.  The widow asked that the creditor give her all the facts 
regarding the origin of the debt so that she could “safely proceed to a trial” of the action at law.   
The court found that she was not entitled to that information and that her request was a “mere 
fishing bill” because it did not seek to substantiate her own defense.60
The plaintiff in Spence v. Duren61 had a similar problem.  He had paid two men for some 
land, and the men were supposed to convey good title to him.  After he had purchased the land, 
however, it turned out that those two men were not the sole owners of the land.  The plaintiff 
sued in equity to compel the other alleged owners to disclose whether they claimed an interest in 
the land and, if so, what their interest was. The plaintiff did not personally know what the 
58Some states, like Alabama, had passed a statute allowing interrogatories to be used in 
law cases rather than having to bring a separate suit in equity, but this did not expand the scope 
of discovery.  The Branch Bank at Montgomery v. Parker, 5 Ala. 731, 1843 Ala. LEXIS 450 
(Ala. 1843).  Mississippi (1828), Missouri (1835), Arkansas (1837), Connecticut (1836), 
Virginia (1831), Georgia (1847), and Massachusetts (1851) all enacted measures allowing at 
least some use of interrogatories in actions at law.  Millar, supra note –, at 446-47.
592 Johns. Cas. 413, 1800 N.Y. LEXIS 168 (N.Y. 1800).  
602 Johns. Cas. at 416.
613 Ala. 251, 1841 Ala. LEXIS 277 (Ala. 1841).
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interests of the two other men might be, and he admitted that in his bill.  The court refused to 
grant relief to the plaintiff because:
the bill deals in suspicions and conjectures, and on belief founded in rumor and hearsay.  
Bills of this vague and uncertain character, which call for a disclosure without positive 
and certain allegations, have been denominated fishing bills; such is the character of this.  
The rules of chancery practice require, that the facts, as to which a discovery is sought . . 
. should be stated with reasonable certainty and precision; that the allegations should be 
direct and positive, and not uncertain and inconclusive, before the defendant can be 
called on to answer.62
In both of these cases, the plaintiff’s lack of information about the defendant’s claims left them 
without recourse in equity.  Their pleadings were rejected as insufficiently specific, and they 
were not allowed to inquire into the facts supporting the claims against them.63
A number of the early nineteenth century cases involve creditors’ attempts to reach assets 
by claiming that the debtor transferred those assets fraudulently.  Under the substantive law 
during that period, indebtedness in any amount at the time of a transfer would render the transfer 
void both as to existing and subsequent creditors (even though the subsequent creditors could not 
possibly have relied on the asset, which was gone before they extended credit).  Based on this 
law, unpaid creditors would try to discover any and all amounts that the debtor might have owed 
at the time a valuable asset was transferred.  The courts referred to these attempts as “fishing 
bills,” and they were generally rejected unless the creditor could identify some specific 
62Id. at 253.
63See also Goodwin v. Wood, 5 Ala. 152, 1843 Ala. LEXIS 308 (Ala. 1843), an action on 
a promissory note in which defendant sent interrogatories asking plaintiff about payments on the 
note.  The trial court said the interrogatories did not need to be answered since defendant did not 
state the precise amount of the several payments.  The same argument was used as an argument 
by a litigant in Smith v. Ramsey, 6 Ill. 373, 1844 Ill. LEXIS 40 at **4 (Ill. 1844), a suit by a 
partner against the heir of two other former partners for his share of land that was conveyed to 
the partnership.  The lawyer for the heir argued: “This bill is wholly uncertain as to what he 




When explaining cases such as these, nineteenth century treatises focused on the 
inadequacy of the pleadings.  Story’s Commentaries on Equity Pleadings, for example, discusses 
Newkirk v. Willett to illustrate that “the Bill [of discovery] should set forth in particular the 
matters, to which the discovery is sought; for the other party is not bound to make answer to 
vague and loose surmises.”65  Similarly, Bray’s treatise ties the right to discovery to the 
sufficiency of the discovering party’s allegations.  He makes it clear that a discovering party is 
expected to already have enough evidence to state a case with particularity before equity will 
help out:
There is a class of actions which stand, to a certain extent, by themselves, namely, what 
are called fishing actions.  Discovery is given in courts of equity to assist a plaintiff in 
proving a known case, and not to assist him in a mere roving speculation, the object of 
which is to see whether he can fish out a case.66
Otherwise, according to Bray, anyone 
might get discovery of all the particulars of any transaction however secret and important 
with which he had no matter of concern merely by introducing into his pleadings the false 
allegation that he had an interest therein. . . It would be a monstrous thing that a man 
64See, e.g., Hoke v. Henderson, 14 N.C. 12, 1831 N.C. LEXIS 41 at **4 (N.C. 1831) (“It 
is upon this foundation, that what are called fishing bills are filed in Equity, to find out a creditor 
at the time of the conveyance, and to bring the whole fund into subjection to general creditors, 
including subsequent creditors, and a fortiori, other creditors at the time.”); Parks v. Jewlett, 36 
Va. 511, 1838 Va. LEXIS 39 at **19 (Va. 1838) (discussing the problem of creditors going after 
emancipated slaves by a “fishing bill”); Fisk v. Slack, 38 Mass. 361, 1838 Mass. LEXIS 167 at 
**6 (Mass. 1838)(bill in equity to get an accounting of certain transactions called a “fishing bill” 
by the party opposing discovery); Toole v. Stancill, 41 N.C. 501, 1849 N.C. LEXIS 256 at **5 
(N.C. 1849) (“This bill is in the nature of what are called fishing bills, which are filed to find out 
a creditor, whose debt existed at the time of the execution of the conveyance, to subject the fund 
to all the creditors, as well those subsequent as antecedent.”)
65JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY PLEADINGS §325, at 263 (1st ed. 1838).
66BRAY, supra note – at 16. 
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merely by alleging that he had a share in a concern . . . could get the accounts of a 
defendant’s private business and of his dealings with other people.”67
The fishing metaphor was used to label both the “own case” limits and particularized pleading 
limits on discovery, both in order to protect rights to property and privacy.68
Nineteenth century commentators added another policy argument for the prohibition on 
fishing to find out an opponent’s evidence: fear of perjury.  Writers (but not courts) expressed a 
concern that if a litigant were allowed to find out his opponent’s evidence in advance, a 
dishonest person would procure evidence to undermine it.  “If you give one side the opportunity 
of knowing the particulars of the evidence that is to be brought against him, then you give a 
rogue an enormous advantage: he may then be able although he has no evidence in support of his 
own case to shape his case and his evidence in such a way as to defeat entirely the ends of 
justice.”69  Others suggested that mutual discovery might actually be beneficial, but regarded the 
“own case” rule as too well established to change.70  This ‘fear of perjury’ explanation for the 
prohibition on fishing was a precursor of what became an argument that the work product of 
attorneys should be protected from discovery.71
67Id. at 25.
68Fleming James’ survey of discovery in 1927 confirmed this two-pronged version of the 
fishing metaphor.  He referred first to the prohibition of “fishing expeditions” which pry into an 
adversary’s case.  He then added that “there are other . . . types of ‘fishing expeditions.’  The 
scope of an examination, an interrogation, or an order for inspection of documents may be so 
broad as to amount to what some courts call a ‘roving commission.’” James, supra note – at 759.
69Id. at 445.
70JAMES WIGRAM, POINTS IN THE LAW OF DISCOVERY 263 (1842) (“If it were now, for the 
first time, to be determined, whether, in the investigation of disputed facts, truth would best be 
elicited by allowing each of the contending parties to know, before the trial, in what manner, and 
by what evidence, his adversary proposed to establish his own case; arguments of some weight 
might á priori be adduced in support of the affirmative of this important question.”)
71Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947) (“Inefficiency, unfairness and sharp 
practices would inevitably develop in the giving of legal advice and in the preparation of cases 
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3. Pre-FRCP State and Federal Cases
a. Fishing is still Forbidden
The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were a time of considerable procedural 
ferment, especially in the areas of pleadings and discovery.72  The most significant set of changes 
began in New York in 1848 with the adoption of the Field Code.  The Field Code merged law 
and equity, eliminated the forms of action, and directed that parties should plead “facts 
constituting the cause of action” in “ordinary and concise language.”  The Code also eliminated 
equitable bills of discovery and interrogatories as part of the equitable bill.  Instead, the Code 
provided for more informative pleadings, some limited document production, and depositions of 
parties (but only in lieu of calling them as witnesses at trial).73  Changes modeled on the Field 
Code were adopted in about half the states by the turn of the century.74  At the same time, states 
began to introduce more discovery devices, and to broaden somewhat the scope of discovery.  
For example, by 1932 seven states allowed depositions from witnesses as well as parties.  Forty 
two states made some provision for the production of documents, and ten allowed written 
interrogatories.75
The federal courts maintained a more conservative approach to discovery.76  While two 
for trial.”).
72This was also a time of significant procedural reform in English courts, particularly 
with the Judicature Acts of 1873 and 1875, which merged law and equity, clearly separated 
interrogatories from pleadings, and provided sanctions for failure to comply with discovery.  See
Millar, supra note – at 444-445.
73Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered the Common Law: The Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 909, 932-39 (1987).
74Id. at 939 (noting that 27 states had adopted similar procedures by 1897).
75RAGLAND, supra note – at 51, 88, 92.
76See James A. Pike & John W. Willis, The New Federal Deposition-Discovery 
Procedure: I, 38 COLUM. L. REV. 1179, 1190 (1938). During this period, the federal courts were 
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statutes permitted depositions in cases at law, they did so only to provide testimony for trial 
when the witness was likely to be absent.77  In equity cases, Equity Rule 58 provided for limited 
discovery.  A party could send interrogatories to opposing parties to discover “facts and 
documents material to the support or defense of the cause.”  Production and inspection of 
documents was possible on judicial order.   In law cases, on the other hand, production would be 
ordered only at trial.78  In addition, although federal courts in common law matters generally 
followed state procedural rules under the Conformity Act, the Supreme Court interpreted the Act 
to prohibit federal courts from adopting the discovery devices of the states in which they sat.79
Federal courts and most state courts during this period continued to condemn “fishing.”  
Many cases used “fishing bill” to mean that a party could not discover information supporting its 
opponent’s case.  This was seen both as an invasion of privacy and property rights, and as 
interference in opposing counsel’s trial strategy.  The Supreme Court cleared up any doubt about 
the continued vitality of the “own case” rule in 1911, in Carpenter v. Winn.80  Plaintiff Winn had 
obtained an order from the trial court requiring defendant Carpenter to produce certain books and 
papers regarding a particular brokerage transaction in cotton in 1905 and 1906.  The Court found 
this discovery to be improper: “[A] bill of discovery cannot be used merely for the purpose of 
enabling the plaintiff . . . to pry into the case of his adversary to learn its strength or weakness.  A 
generally seen as protective of corporate interests.  See generally Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The 
Story of Erie, in CIVIL PROCEDURE STORIES 24-32 (KEVIN CLERMONT, ED. 2004).
7728 U.S.C. § 639 (permitting depositions “when the witness lived more than one hundred 
miles from the place of trial, or was on a voyage at sea, or about to go out of the United States, or 
when the witness was aged and infirm”); 28 U.S.C. § 644 (allowing depositions by a commission 
out of chancery only when “necessary to prevent a failure or delay of justice”).
78Carpenter v. Winn, 221 U.S. 533 (1911).
79Ex parte Fisk, 113 U.S.713 (1885).
80221 U.S. 533 (1911).
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discovery sought upon suspicion, surmise, or vague guesses is called a ‘fishing bill,’ and will be 
dismissed. . . Such a bill must seek only evidence which is material to the support of the 
complainant’s own case, and prying into the nature of his adversary’s case will not be 
tolerated.”81
Federal courts also used the term “fishing expedition” to criticize plaintiffs who sued 
before having a sufficiently detailed case.   After discussing the “own case” limit, the court in 
Goodrich Zinc Corp. v. Carlin82 went on to condemn speculative litigation as fishing: “[E]ven in 
an inquiry as to your own case, the questions asked must not be ‘fishing’; that is, they must refer 
to some definite and existing state of circumstances, and not be put merely in the hopes of 
discovering something which may help the party interrogating to make out some case.”83  The 
Supreme Court had earlier criticized a creditor’s attempt to get a wife’s assets to pay her 
husband’s debts in a fraudulent transfer case.  The creditor had failed to describe the assets with 
particularity “because all particular information is refused by the [husband] and his wife and the 
persons managing the property for them, and because the same has been invested for income, 
and often changed in form by reinvestment and in pursuance of devices for more effectual 
concealment.”84  Rather than taking pity on the creditor, the Court called his suit a “fishing bill” 
81Id. at 540.
824 F.2d 568 (W.D. Mo. 1925).
83Id. at 569 .  See also Stokes Bros. Manuf’g Co. v. Heller, 56 F. 297 (C.C.D.N.J. 1893) 
(In a patent infringement case, court refused to allow plaintiff to inspect defendant’s 
manufacturing plant since plaintiff had not produced “a particle of evidence” to sustain its 
claims.  “Under these circumstances, to compel the defendants to open their manufactory to 
hostile inspection of rivals in business, and to disclose the character of the machines and the 
process by which for so many years they have made a successful article of merchandise, would 
be unjust and inequitable.  The motion is too obviously the excuse for a ‘fishing excursion.’” Id. 
at 298).
84Huntington v. Saunders, 120 U.S. 78 (1886) .
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because “the substance of what they say is, that they have received certain information which 
excites their suspicion; and this information is . . .  vague, . . . uncertain and indefinite.”85
State cases during the period were mostly to the same effect.  Some referred to discovery 
requests seeking information about an adversary’s case as fishing bills.86  Others rejected 
discovery requests from plaintiffs they believed to be suing without a sufficient factual basis.  In 
one New York case, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants entered into an agreement to secure 
a monopoly of the business of selling calves in certain stockyards in New York City.  The 
defendants admitted to an agreement, but denied that it was designed to monopolize.  The 
plaintiffs tried to discover a copy of the agreement, the defendants objected, and the court 
refused to order discovery:
[T]his application is a mere expedient for the purpose of seeing whether they may or may 
not have a cause of action . . . They desire to make amongst the private papers of these 
defendants an experimental voyage of discovery in the hope that, perhaps, they may be 
able to fish out something they may turn to their advantage.  It does not seem to us that 
such a mere fishing expedition should be countenanced by the court.”87
The creditor in George v. Solomon88 lost because he lacked sufficient pre-suit information.  He 
alleged that he had paid his rent twice, once to Mr. Ragsdale and then to Mrs. Ragsdale, because 
there was a dispute as to whether Mr. Ragsdale had been acting as his wife’s agent when 
85Id. at 80. The court went on to explain that this policy was needed to protect wives’ 
separate estates.
86See, e.g., DeLacy v. Walcott, 13 N.Y.S. 800, 802-03, 1891 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 1685 
(Superior Ct. 1891).
87Phillips v. Curtis, 75 N.Y.S. 551, 554, 1902 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 745 (1902).  See 
also McCleod v. Griffis, 8 S.W. 837, 841 (Ark. 1888) (bill in chancery to impeach the settlement 
of an administrator in probate court, a kind of collateral attack on the probate court judgment 
requiring a showing of fraud, accident, or mistake.  The plaintiffs had identified certain frauds 
and mistakes and sought to inspect the books to find others.  The court refused to allow it: “In the 
language of ancient jurisprudence, ‘the court of chancery will not entertain a fishing bill.’”).
8814 So. 531, 533 (Miss. 1893).
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collecting the $1,000 rent.  He asked that personal representatives of the husband and wife be 
required to show which of them should repay the amount.  The court found his case to be “a pure 
and simple fishing bill, and complainant angles in the broadest water.”89  Since the unhappy 
payor could not plead which defendant owed him the money, he was entitled to no help from the 
court.
An example may help to make clear the degree of specificity, and consequent limits on 
the scope of discovery, that were common during this period:
[I]t may be part of a party’s case to prove that his adversary’s title is defective, so that an 
interrogatory such as “Is there not an outstanding mortgage to A on this land?” would be 
proper.  Yet to allow a party to require his adversary simply to set out his title might be 
undesirable.  At any rate, the courts evince a strong tendency to discountenance such 
broad interrogation.90
Discovery, then, was permitted only to allow a party to access – from the opponent – otherwise 
unavailable but known evidence to support its own case, information exchange took place 
primarily at trial, and no one was supposed to file suit unless he already had enough evidence to 
prove a prima facie case.  Attempts to deviate from these principles were unacceptable fishing.
b. Fishing Allowed
A few state decisions during this period, however, declared that “fishing” could be a good 
89Id. at 533.  The court suggested that if equity afforded relief in this situation, “we see no 
reason why the owner of lost or stolen property might not implead in one suit the residents of a 
city or county, upon the averment that some one of them – which one the complainant is not 
informed – has converted his property, and is liable for its value.”
90James, supra note – at 759.  See also Terry v. Stull, 169 A. 739, 741 (Del. Ch. 1933) (in 
a case alleging fraud on the deceased, rejecting as a “fishing expedition” interrogatories “calling 
on Philip B. Stull to say whether he ever turned over any money to his father, asking for the 
amounts, if paid by check the names of the banks, the nature of the transactions, whether he ever 
received any power of attorney from his father of any kind, whether he ever acted in any way as 
agent for his father, and things of that sort. . . Interrogatories of that type appear to me to be shots 
in the dark fired in the hope that they may hit a mark.”)
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thing.  The Kansas Supreme Court in 1874 was asked to decide whether a party could compel a 
witness to give his deposition prior to trial for discovery purposes.  The court approved of the 
practice:   “It is . . . said that this permits one to go on a ‘fishing expedition’ to ascertain his 
adversary’s testimony.  This is an equal right of both parties, and justice will not be apt to suffer 
if each party knows fully beforehand his adversary’s testimony.”91  A later Kansas case reached 
the same result, and ran with the metaphor: “Even if they were fishing – for it is permissible in a 
case of this kind – they must exercise as much cunning and circumspection as if whipping the 
trout streams, while trying to establish their alleged commercial frauds.  We think this case 
presents a justifiable fishing expedition.”92
New York courts were split on the issue, but one trial court rejected a complaint about 
fishing in 1899.  “It is said in decisions, and is now said by counsel for the defendant, that 
[depositions] must not be ‘fishing excursions.’  If a party wants to use the testimony of an 
opposite party to prove a certain fact within his knowledge, I do not know why he should not be 
permitted to probe his conscience for it, or ‘fish’ for it if the phraseology of certain decisions 
must be followed.  What the courts are after is the truth, and a system of technicalities and pit 
falls should not be put in the way.”93
Despite this occasional acceptance of “fishing,” the own case rule persisted (although it 
91In re Abeles, 12 Kan. 451, 453, 1874 Kan. LEXIS 89 (Kan. 1874).  Justice David 
Brewer, who wrote this opinion, later became a Justice of the United States Supreme Court.  
Sunderland, supra note – at 871.
92In re Merkle, 19 P. 401, 402 (Kan. 1888).  Kansas later changed its mind, forbidding the 
use of deposition procedures for “fishing expeditions.” In re Davis, 16 P. 790 (Kan. 1888).
93Hay v. Zeiger, 61 N.Y.S. 647, 647 (Sup. Ct. 1899).  See also Pike & Willis, I, supra
note – at 1194 (“The objection to pre-action discovery on the ground that it will allow ‘fishing 
out a case’ is not particularly sound (if the plaintiff has a case he should be aided in fishing it 
out).”).
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was sometimes liberalized so that one’s “own case” included negating the opponent’s case).94
Professor Sunderland suggested that the chancery bar did not try very hard to change the rule, for 
reasons of their own.  First, the restrictions on discovery “produced an enormous amount of 
lucrative litigation over the application of the rules.”  Second, the discovery limits produced 
enough uncertainty at trial that “a lawyer might always feel confident of having a fighting chance 
of success no matter what side of any case he might be employed to represent.”95
4. Drafting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
During the end of this time period, the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure was engaged in drafting what would become the new pleading and discovery rules.96
They did this against a background of scholarly work calling for liberalization of pleading rules 
and expansion of discovery rights.  Charles Clark, the Dean of Yale Law School and Reporter to 
the Advisory Committee, had written about the wastefulness of detailed pleadings and pleading 
disputes.97  Edson Sunderland, who would become the drafter of the federal discovery rules, had 
also explained why pleadings were not sufficient to reveal the facts that lawyers needed to 
prepare cases and advise their clients regarding settlement.98  As to discovery, Fleming James of 
94Sunderland noted in 1933 that twelve states “make discovery available not only for 
attack but for defense – not merely to aid parties in assembling their own proof but to protect 
them from surprise and to relieve them from taking unnecessary and useless precautions to meet 
evidence that will never be offered.” Sunderland, supra note – at 870 (listing Alabama, Indiana, 
Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, Ohio, Texas, 
and Wisconsin).
95Sunderland, Scope, supra note – at 868.
96For a far more complete account of the historical background of the drafting of the 
federal discovery rules, see Subrin, Fishing, supra note – .
97CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING (1928); Charles E. 
Clark & James Wm. Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure II: Pleadings and Parties, 44 YALE 
L.J. 1291 (1935).
98Edson Sunderland, Scope and Method of Discovery Before Trial, 42 YALE L.J 863, 863-
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Yale had written in 1929 to recommend eliminating the “own case” rule, allowing depositions 
and more expansive document production, and leaving the issue of the overbreadth version of 
“fishing” to be dealt with at the trial court’s discretion.99 Robert Millar of Northwestern also 
wrote shortly before the adoption of the federal rules, comparing numerous systems of civil 
procedure and recommending the adoption of the oral deposition.100
Criticism of the pre-FRCP limits on discovery included criticism of the “fishing 
expedition” metaphor.  Sunderland, for example, wrote:
False and fictitious causes and defenses thrive under a system of concealment and 
secrecy in the preliminary stages of litigation followed by surprise and confusion at the 
trial . . . All this is well recognized by the profession, and yet there is a wide-spread fear 
of liberalizing discovery.  Hostility to ‘fishing expeditions’ before trial is a traditional and 
powerful taboo.101
Pike and Willis complained in 1938 of the “shibboleth – repeated to the point of nausea – that the 
court would not sanction ‘fishing expeditions.’”102 George Ragland, a student of Sunderland’s, 
wrote an influential book promoting the expansion of discovery, with examples from 
contemporary state practices.  He noted that “the epithet ‘fishing excursion for the adverse 
party’s evidence’ has been employed against the taking of depositions for discovery in every 
state where it has been attempted. . . . Judicial opinion, however, has been opposed to 
65 (1932-33).
99James, supra note – at 759, 773-74.
100Millar, supra note – at 455.
101Edson R. Sunderland, Foreword to RAGLAND, supra note – at iii (1932).
102James A. Pike & John W. Willis, The New Federal Deposition-Discovery Procedure: 
II, 38 COLUM. L. REV. 1436, 1437 (1938).   The Biblical use of “shibboleth” is found in Judges
12:5-6, literally a difference in pronunciation used to tell whether one was a member of the 
favored tribe.  In modern usage a shibboleth is an arbitrary test to prove membership in a group.  
See Answers.com, Shibboleth, at http://www.answers.com/topic/shibboleth (last visited June 30, 
2005).  It is not unusual to find the metaphor associated (by its critics) with such quasi-religious 
language.  Cf. text accompanying notes – supra (noting religious language used to describe 
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restriction.”103
The fishing expedition metaphor appears in the Advisory Committee’s discussion of the 
discovery rules.  Members seemed more concerned about the potential for speculative litigation 
than about the “own case” rule, and to be more worried about protecting defendants than 
plaintiffs.104  It is not always clear just what they meant by the metaphor, however.  Committee 
Chairman William De Witt Mitchell warned, “I feel very strongly . . . We are going to have an 
outburst against this discovery business unless we can hedge it about with some appearance of 
safety against fishing expeditions.”105   A member of the legal staff of the Advisory Committee 
told the Fourth Circuit Judicial Conference that the proposed discovery rules had been amended 
to “be a protection to defendants against fishing expeditions, in that an unscrupulous plaintiff 
cannot file a complaint alleging any sort of claim which occurs to him, take a deposition of the 
defendant, as a result of which he discovers a claim which he thinks he might sustain, and then 
amend his complaint asserting the claim.”106  On the other hand, committee member Senator 
actual fishing).
103RAGLAND, supra note – at 120.  Ragland quotes William Howard Taft, when he was 
on the Ohio Supreme Court, as opposing this ‘own case’ version of the prohibition on fishing: 
“There is no objection that I know why each party should not know the other’s case.”  Shaw v. 
Ohio Edison Co., 9 O. Dec. Reprint 809, 812 (Super. Ct. 1887).
104A number of jurisdictions (including New York) retained the most restrictive version 
of the own case rule – a party could discover information only about issues on which they had 
the burden of proof under the pleadings.  This tended to restrict defendants’ discovery unless 
they filed affirmative defenses, while plaintiffs could do discovery to get information supporting 
their claims.  Eliminating the own case rule in these jurisdictions actually helped defendants 
more than plaintiffs.  See RAGLAND, supra note – at 32.
105Proceedings of the Meeting of the Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure 
of the Supreme Court of the United States (Feb. 22, 1936), in RECORDS OF THE U.S. JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE: COMMITTEES ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURES, 1935-1988, at CI-209-60-
CI-209-61, cited in Subrin, Fishing, supra note – at 722.
106Edward H. Hammond, Some Changes in the Preliminary Draft of the Proposed 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 23 A.B.A.J. 629, 631 (1937).  Hammond was referring to the 
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George Wharton Pepper at one point said, “Mr. Chairman, I am not worried about the fishing-
expedition aspect of this thing, but, in the part of the country I come from, I know perfectly well 
that this sort of power given to a plaintiff [referring to depositions] is simply going to be used as 
a means of ruining the reputation of responsible people.”107  Pepper, then, seems to refer to 
“fishing expedition” as something other than the danger of litigation brought only for its 
settlement value. 
5. Reactions to Procedural Reform
a. Fishing Allowed
Whatever they meant, those who admired the new federal discovery rules had no use for 
the discovery objections articulated as “I object; this is fishing.” For this group of the legal elite, 
fishing was an acceptable practice.  They hoped that the norm under the new rules would be 
determination of cases on the merits, not on the pleadings, and that information exchange would 
come through the discovery process.  Writing a year after the rules went into effect, Pike and 
Willis emphasized (in a section titled “Fishing Expeditions”) that it was permissible to fish.  
“When the new rules went into effect it was assumed that an end was put to the time-honored 
stricture on ‘fishing expeditions’ imposed by the rule that a party might not discover facts 
provision that depositions could not normally be taken until after an answer had been filed.  He 
also mentioned a provision that enabled the court to make an order confining the examination to 
matters that relate to the issues as raised by the pleadings.
107Proceedings of the Advisory Committee (Feb. 22, 1935), supra note – , at CI-209-59-
CI-209-60.  Pepper expanded on his concerns: “You bring a suit against a man, without any 
ground whatever – the president of some important company . . . You take his deposition, have 
the reporters present, and grill him in the most unfair way, intimating that he is a burglar or a 
murderer, or this, that, and the other.  He has no redress, and the next morning the papers have a 
whole lot of front-page stuff.  The case never goes any further.  That is all that was intended.”  
(Chairman Mitchell responded: “It is too much like some of these Senate committees you used to 
sit on.”).  Id.
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concerning his opponent’s case.”108 Similarly, Holtzoff wrote, “That the proceeding may 
constitute a ‘fishing expedition’ is not a valid objection to interrogatories.  As a matter of 
fairness, if there appears to be a reasonable probability or even possibility that there may be fish 
in the pond, there is no reason why the litigant should not be permitted to endeavor to catch 
them.”109
Most of the earliest post-Rule cases embraced broad discovery110 and rejected the fishing 
expedition objection.  Judge Moskowitz of the Eastern District of New York immediately 
became famous for holding that “[l]imitations which have been placed upon deposition-taking by 
state courts, such as the necessity of having the affirmative upon the issue on which examination 
is sought, find no basis in the new Rules.  It will not avail a party to raise the familiar cry of 
‘fishing expedition.’”111
b. Fishing Still Forbidden
Some areas of concern remained, however, and continued to receive the pejorative label 
108James A. Pike & John W. Willis, Federal Discovery in Operation, 7 U. CHI. L. REV.
297, 301 (1939-40).
109Alexander Holtzoff, Instruments of Discovery Under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
41 MICH. L. REV. 205, 215 (1942-43).
110Two weeks after the rules went into effect, a court ruled that the discovery provisions 
had done away with many of the old limitations on discovery: “the distinction between discovery 
of ‘evidentiary’ facts and ‘ultimate or material’ facts is abolished, as is the holding . . . that 
discovery could be obtained only of matters exclusively . . . within the knowledge . . . of the 
adverse party . . . and further, it is now established that parties also may be interrogated as to the 
identity and location of persons having knowledge of relevant facts. . . . Under the present rule 
discovery may be had now to ascertain facts relating not only to the party’s own case but his 
adversary’s also.”  Nichols v. Sanborn Co., 24 F. Supp. 908, 910 (D. Mass. 1938).
111Laverett v. Cont’l Briar Pipe Co., 25 F. Supp. 80, 81 (E.D.N.Y. 1938).  See also Glick 
v. McKesson, 10 F.R.D. 477, 479 (W.D. Mo. 1950) (“‘Fishing expeditions’ for evidentiary facts 
are permitted under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”); Gutowitz v. Pa. R. Co., 7 F.R.D. 
144, 146 (E.D. Pa. 1945) (same); Pezza v. Williams-Bauer Corp., 3 F.R.D. 355, 355-56 
(S.D.N.Y. 1942) (“examinations before trial frequently are permissible ‘fishing expeditions’ 
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“fishing expedition.”  The metaphor often signaled that plaintiffs needed more evidence before 
they could file suit.  General pleading, particularly in cases tinged with fraud allegations, were 
rejected by some courts.112  In Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corporation,113 a stockholder 
sued for an accounting of funds that were allegedly fraudulently diverted for the personal gain of 
members of the board of directors.  He alleged that the corporation improperly paid an affiliate 
substantial sums of money unsupported by proper documentation.  The court dismissed those 
allegations:
The plaintiff’s charge that many payments were illegal and improperly made, without 
further enlargement, is insufficient to meet even the bare requirements of the rules of 
pleading.  The further averment by plaintiff that “an examination of officers and 
directors” will disclose which payments were illegal and ultra vires, stamps this alleged 
cause of action as one disclosing an aspiration rather than a claim upon which recovery 
may be had . . . I do not understand that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure . . . will . . . 
permit the plaintiff to call witnesses in a fishing expedition, with the hope that 
somewhere or somehow it may develop that a defendant has some liability.114
Similarly, in a case involving an insolvent bank, the court rejected depositors’ claims that the 
Comptroller had paid out unreasonably large amounts.  “The allegations of the complaint . . . 
conclude with the revelation that the appellant does not even know the amounts and details of 
such fees and expenses.  The conclusion is obvious that the preceding allegations upon 
information are pure guesswork and the suit a fishing expedition.”115
under the federal practice”).
112Even under the Federal Rules, allegations of the circumstances constituting fraud must 
be plead with particularity.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
11369 F. Supp. 297 (D.N.J. 1946).
114Id. at 301.  The opinion quoted Mebco Realty Holding Co. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 
44 F. Supp. 591, 592 (D.N.J. 1942), for the “fishing” language.  Mebco was an antitrust case 
regarding movie theaters in which the defendant in question was the bank that loaned the money 
to construct a new, competing theater, and the court expressed considerable skepticism about the 
plaintiff’s claim, granting summary judgment.
115Lucking v. Delano, 122 F.2d 21, 26 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (dismissing class action).  See 
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Discovery cases also found a home for the metaphor, still used to set limits on discovery.  
Sometimes it was a generalized feeling that the requested discovery was unlikely to yield 
relevant information.  One court terminated the deposition of corporate officers:
[T]he court has examined the depositions so far as taken.  The transcript so far contains 
about 1,000 pages.  His examination progressed from interest to boredom, and thence to a 
certain amount of shock. . . . Granting that Rule No. 26 has a tendency somewhat to 
encourage fishing expeditions, still the fishing is subject to some license and limit, and 
should not be continued day after day when the catch is composed of minnows.116
Other courts used “fishing” to criticize the language of document production requests.  One 
much-cited case denied a motion to produce documents, saying that the words “‘any and all”’ 
documents were not sufficiently descriptive.  “Undoubtedly the rules are to be liberally construed 
(Rule 1), but it was never intended by these Rules to revolutionize the practice by allowing 
fishing excursions.”117
The fishing metaphor also had a more technical use, distinguishing the amount of probing 
allowed by the various discovery devices.  In the most common version of this, depositions and 
interrogatories could be used to fish,118 but requests for document production could not.119  Some 
also United States ex rel Schiff v. Atlantic Basin Iron Works, 53 F. Supp. 268, 271 (E.D.N.Y. 
1943) (granting motion for bill of particulars).
116Heiner v. N. Am. Coal Corp., 3 F.R.D. 64, 65 (W.D. Pa. 1942).
117Thomas French & Sons v. Carleton Venetian Blind Co., 30 F. Supp. 903, 905 
(E.D.N.Y. 1939). See also Ft. Wayne Corrugated Paper Co. v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 4 
F.R.D. 328, 330 (W.D. Pa. 1940) (“the use of the word ‘all’ in connection with these minutes and 
this correspondence would seem to indicate that the plaintiff is engaged in a fishing excursion 
rather than the production of specified documents”).
118Byers Theaters v. Murphy, 1 F.R.D. 286, 288 (W.D. Va. 1940) (“A general objection, 
that the interrogatories constitute a ‘fishing expedition,’ is of no avail.”).  But see The J.L. Jr., 64 
F. Supp. 185, 185-86 (E.D.N.Y. 1945) (quoting a 1917 Learned Hand opinion to support the 
conclusion that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure had not broadened the scope and use of 
interrogatories, and thus they could not be used to “pry into [the] adversary’s case”).
119This belief was not surprising, since at this time document production still required a 
motion and showing of good cause, and because old equity cases had placed particular limits on 
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courts thus rejected requests as insufficiently specific in designating the desired documents.  
Welty v. Clute,120 for example, required the discovering party to begin by taking depositions to 
identify such documents as existed, and only then to request the documents themselves.  “[T]he 
motion seems to partake much of the nature of a ‘fishing expedition.’  This was not the intent of 
[Rule 34].”121  A few years later, another court maintained that “[f]rom Rule 34 . . .  there has 
evolved the frequent repeated legal holding that roving and fishing expeditions into an 
adversary’s files will not be permitted.”122  Holtzoff, although he approved of fishing with 
depositions and interrogatories, thought that document requests were more limited and could be 
used only to get documents that constitute or contain material evidence.  “A roving inspection or 
a dragnet, or a fishing excursion is not permitted under Rule 34.”123  Other courts disagreed, 
finding fishing to be appropriate for document production.  The most quoted, Golden Arcadia 
Mutual Casualty Co., rejected the defendant’s “fishing” argument, saying that the discovery 
rules, including Rule 34, “permit ‘fishing’ for evidence, as they should.  If documents in 
defendant’s possession tend to sustain plaintiff’s claim, plaintiff is entitled to inspect them and 
have the use of them as evidence.”124
c. Fishing for Trial Preparation Materials
document production.  See BRAY, supra note – at 151 (equity courts less inclined to order 
documents produced than interrogatories answered).
12029 F. Supp. 2 (W.D.N.Y. 1939).
121Id. at 2.
122H-P-M Dev. Corp. v. Watson-Stillman Co., 71 F. Supp. 906, 914 (D.N.J. 1947).  
Interestingly, the court cited no cases to demonstrate the “frequent repeated legal holding.”  See 
also Archer v. Cornillaud, 41 F. Supp. 435, 436 (D. Ky. 1941) (plaintiff must designate 
particular books and records and also state facts showing that the information contained is 
relevant to the case).
123Holtzoff, supra note – at 219.
124Golden Arcadia Mut. Cas. Co., 3 F.R.D. 26, 26 (N.D. Ill. 1942).  See also Olson 
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The greatest split of authority was that over trial preparation materials.125  Was it 
improper fishing to request copies of statements taken by an opponent in preparation for trial? 
Under the old equity practice, this issue did not tend to arise as such.  Discovery of that kind of 
information was prohibited by the “own case” rule, as well as by the notion that one could 
discover “facts” but not “evidence” and the requirement that documents be admissible in order to 
be discoverable.  Under the new discovery rules, however, such information was potentially 
discoverable unless protected under the rubric of “privilege.” This issue, of course, reached its 
climax in the Supreme Court’s opinion in Hickman v. Taylor126 and, not surprisingly, included 
references to “fishing.”
The Third Circuit, in creating a new protection of the “work product of the lawyer” 
rejected arguments that would have returned to pre-Rule sensibilities.  “As we approach this 
question we must discard some favorite craft notions of the advocate. . . .   We must . . .  discard 
the notion that questions from the other side can be fended off on the ground that the opponent’s 
lawyer is simply engaged in a fishing expedition.”127
Justice Murphy’s majority opinion for the Supreme Court contains what is undoubtedly 
the best-known example of the metaphor.  He noted the splits in the case law, discussed the roles 
of pleadings and discovery in the new rules, and affirmed the importance of disclosure:
We agree, of course, that the deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and 
liberal treatment.  No longer can the time-honored cry of “fishing expedition” serve to 
Transp. Co. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 7 F.R.D. 134, 136 (D. Wis. 1944).
125Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure, Report of Proposed Amendments 
(June, 1946), 5 F.R.D. 433, 457-60 (citing cases); Holtzoff, supra note – at 211- 12 (citing 
cases); Pike & Willis, Operation, supra note – at 303-07 (citing cases); Hickman v. Taylor, 153 
F.2d 212, 216 n.6 (3d Cir. 1946), aff’d, 329 U.S. 495 (1947) (citing cases).
126329 U.S. 495 (1947).
127153 F.2d at 216.
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preclude a party from inquiring into the facts underlying his opponent’s case.  Mutual 
knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper 
litigation.128
In dismissing the “time honored cry,” Justice Murphy cited Pike and Willis’s article about 
discovery in operation which, as noted earlier, identified the “fishing expedition” objection with 
the “own case” rule.129  He was also cribbing language from Judge Moskowitz’s 1938 opinion 
(“It will not avail a party to raise the familiar cry of ‘fishing expedition’”), which also referred to 
the “own case” rule.130  The Court was, in effect, overruling its former decision in Carpenter v. 
Winn, which itself had embodied the own case limit on discovery.131  What, then, was the 
Supreme Court rejecting as an objection to discovery?  In the context of Hickman itself, the issue 
was not a claim that the suit itself was speculative, or that the interrogatories were too generally 
worded.  It was, though, an attempt to discover the basis of an opponent’s case, as the statements 
in question were taken from tug company employees by the tug company’s lawyer.  Perhaps this 
much-quoted endorsement of liberal discovery had a narrower meaning than we thought.132
d. The Federal Courts React to Hickman
Whatever Justice Murphy’s intent, federal courts in the period following Hickman latched 
128329 U.S. at 507 (emphasis added).
129Pike & Willis, Operation, supra note – at 301.
130See text accompanying notes – supra.
131Carpenter v. Winn, 221 U.S. 533, 540 (1911).
132Even if Hickman referred only to the “own case” rule, however, it is clear that the 
drafters of the federal rules intended for “fishing” – in the sense of downplaying the role of 
pleadings and using discovery to gather information about a case – to be proper.  See, e.g., 
Charles E. Clark, The Influence of Federal Procedural Reform, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 144, 
157 (1948) (repudiating the objection to “fishing expeditions” allows discovery by all litigants of 
all features of a case); Charles E. Clark, Experience Under the Amendment to the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, 8 F.R.D. 497 (1948) (1946 discovery rule revisions allowed discovery of 
information “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence” in order to 
clarify that the Rules intended to eliminate complaints about fishing).
35
onto his language, and the propriety of fishing expeditions was noted in a number of cases at that 
time.    It was cited to show that the scope of discovery was measured by “subject matter” rather 
than pleadings,133 that there was good cause for production of documents,134 that a party must 
provide factual answers, even if the information came through his attorneys,135 that a party need 
not depose witnesses before requesting production of documents,136 that a party may do 
discovery even of information within its own knowledge,137 and that designation of documents 
was sufficiently specific.138  In short, federal courts used Hickman’s rejection of “fishing 
expedition” as an objection to support decisions that refused to carry the limitations of the old 
equitable bill of discovery forward into the new federal discovery rules, and to endorse the policy 
that cases were best decided based on mutual sharing of relevant information.
e. State Courts Remain Mostly Hostile to Fishing
Meanwhile, state court discovery reform came later, and so the “fishing expedition” 
metaphor was still used to reinforce traditional limits on pleading and discovery.  Judges 
employed a prohibition on fishing to limit the discovering party to information about its own 
133Chem. Specialties Co. v. CIBA Pharm. Prod., Inc., 10 F.R.D. 500, 501-02 (D.N.J. 
1950); Dusha v. Pa. R.R. Co., 10 F.R.D. 150, 151 (N.D. Ohio 1950).
134Paramount Film Dist. Corp. v. RAM, 91 F. Supp. 778, 780 (E.D.S.C. 1950); Michel v. 
Meier, 8 F.R.D. 464, 476 (W.D. Pa. 1948); Lindsay v. Prince, 8 F.R.D. 233, 235 (N.D. Ohio 
1948); Hirshhorn v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 8 F.R.D. 11, 21 (W.D. Pa. 1948); Dulansky v. 
Iowa & Illinois Gas & Elec. Co., 10 F.R.D. 146 (S.D. Iowa 1950) (also holding that other 
document requests were insufficiently specific).
135O’Donnell v. Breuninger, 9 F.R.D. 245, 247 (D.D.C. 1949) (holding, in an alienation 
of affections case, that plaintiff husband was required to answer a question as to what knowledge 
he had of his wife and defendant sharing a hotel room).
136Hawaiian Airlines v. Trans-Pacific Airlines, 8 F.R.D. 449, 450-51 (D. Haw. 1948); 
Lindsay v. Prince, 8 F.R.D. 233 (N.D. Ohio 1948).
137Brown v. Dunbar & Sullivan Dredging Co., 8 F.R.D. 107, 108 (W. D. N.Y. 1948).
138Henz v. United States, 9 F.R.D. 291 (N.D. Cal. 1949).
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case,139 to refuse to allow discovery to try to identify additional parties,140 to refuse to allow 
depositions to be used except to perpetuate testimony from a witness who would be unavailable 
at trial,141 or to conclude that a request for documents did not plead enough facts to demonstrate 
that the documents contained material evidence.142  “Fishing expedition” was also used in 
granting a motion for more definite statement.143  The fishing metaphor was common in election 
contests,144 business owners’ requests to inspect books and records,145 attempts by creditors to 
find assets,146 and requests to question jurors to try to prove jury misconduct.147
The Alabama case of Ex parte Brooks illustrates the gap between discovery theory then 
and now.148  Alabama law at the time allowed deposition of women before trial to spare them the 
embarrassment of appearing in court.  The issue in Brooks was whether this law could be used to 
force a female litigant to give pre-trial deposition testimony in place of the normal interrogatory 
139See, e.g., Chandler v. Taylor, 12 N.W.2d 590 (Iowa 1944); Tremblay v. Lyon, 29 
N.Y.S.2d  336 (Sup. Ct. 1941); State ex rel Laughoin v. Sartorious, 119 S.W.2d 471 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1938).
140Rost v. Kessler, 39 N.Y.S.2d 863 (Sup. Ct. 1943) (holding that plaintiff could not 
examine defendant regarding whether he was acting in scope of employment at time of accident); 
Monroe v. Superior Court, 218 P.2d 136 (Cal. Ct. App. 1950) (holding that wife could not 
compel husband to divulge names of adultery “accomplices”).
141State ex rel Westerheide v. Shilling, 123 P.2d 674 (Okla. 1942).
142Marietta Mfg. Co. v. Hedges-Walsh-Weidner Co., 2 A.2d 922 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1938); 
Eastern States Corp. v. Eisler, 30 A.2d 867 (Md. App. 1943).
143Flintosh v. Elko, 48 Pa. D. & C. 72 (Ct. Comm. Pl. 1943).
144Colorado ex rel Harper v. City of Pueblo, 126 P.2d 339 (Colo. 1942); Landry v. 
Ozenne, 195 So. 14 (La. 1940).
145Chandler v. Taylor, 12 N.W.2d 590 (Iowa 1944) (partner); Dandini v. Superior Court, 
100 P.2d 535 (Cal. Ct. App. 1940) (director); News-Journal Corp. v. Florida, 187 So. 271 (Fla. 
1939) (shareholder); Eastern States Corp. v. Eisler, 30 A.2d 867 (Md. App. 1943) (shareholder).
146Biltrite Bldg. Co. v. Adams, 7 S.E.2d 857 (S.C. 1940); Missouri ex rel Bostelmann v. 
Aronson, 235 S.W. 2d 384 (Mo. 1950).
147Christesen v. Boucher, 24 N.W.2d 782 (Iowa 1946); Thompson v. Ry. Express 
Agency, 206 S.W.2d 134 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
14832 So.2d 534 (Ala. 1947).
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replies.  The court said no: “Can we imagine that the legislature meant to authorize the practice 
of allowing a woman to be harassed with experimental fishing expeditions in anticipation of the 
trial, and to make the statute an instrument of annoyance to her or even of oppression when such 
right does not exist when the opposing party sought to be examined is a man?”149
As states began to amend their pleading and discovery rules in line with the federal rules, 
commentators on those changes tended to comment that the fishing expedition objection was no 
longer valid.  An Arizona lawyer, urging a modern mindset to go with the modern rules, noted 
that the scope of depositions was “practically unlimited and the old cry of ‘fishing expedition’ is 
no longer a valid objection – fishing expeditions are encouraged for they tend to bring out the 
facts.”150  The Chair of Alabama’s Commission for Judicial Reform in 1957 described the 
problems posed by the old rules.  “Any effort by interrogatories, or otherwise, to obtain a clear 
picture of the factual situation in any case was met with the ancient hue and cry of ‘fishing 
expedition’ with the result that each party and the court were required to enter upon the trial of 
the case without any knowledge of the factual contentions of the parties.”151
6. Contemporary Cases
Given the early enthusiasm for notice pleading and wider discovery, and for less 
technicality in both, application of the “fishing expedition” metaphor was for a time on the 
decline, or used for issues on the margins.  As Professor Marcus has so ably demonstrated, 
however, by the 1970s there was a swing in the other direction in both pleading particularity and 
149Id. at 536.
150Lyle Roger Allen, The New Rules in Arizona, 16 F.R.D. 183 (1955).
151Thomas E. Skinner, Alabama’s Approach to a Modern System of Pleading and 
Practice, 20 F.R.D. 119 (1957).
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scope of discovery.152  For example, a legal commission appointed by then-Chief Justice Warren 
Burger claimed, “Wild fishing expeditions . . . seem to be the norm.”153  Along with this swing 
came the broader use of the negative invocation of the “fishing expedition” metaphor.  Hickman
is still cited as supporting liberal discovery, but it is immediately followed by a qualifier that 
prohibits fishing.154
In terms of subject matter, the largest clusters of the state cases using the fishing 
metaphor involve personal injury claims,155 shareholder disputes,156 disputes with insurance 
companies,157 and employment discrimination.158  State cases use “fishing expedition” 
152See Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433 (1986); Richard L. Marcus, Discovery Containment Redux, 
39 B.C. L. REV. 747 (1998).
153William H. Erikson, The Pound Conference Recommendations: A Blueprint for the 
Justice System in the Twenty-First Century, 76 F.R.D. 277, 288 (1978).
154See, e.g., Ameristar Jet Charter, Inc. v. Signal Composites, Inc., 244 F.3d 189, 192-93 
(1st Cir. 2001); Martinez v. Cornell Corr. of Texas, No. CIV 04-0255 JB/RLP, 2005 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 14618, at *6 (D.N.M. Feb. 15, 2005).
155See, e.g., Rehm v. Pence, No. G028059, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 11699, at *18-
19 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 17, 2002); Kaplan v. Allen, 837 So. 2d 1174, 1176 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2003); McPherson v. Church of Scientology Flag Serv. Org., Inc., 813 So.2d 1032, 1034 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2002); Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Camara de Comercio Latino-Americana de Los 
Estados Unidos, Inc., 813 So. 2d 250, 252 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002); Vermette v. Bridges, No. 
CV-99-187, 2000 Me. Super. LEXIS 2, at *6 (Me. 2000); Hiller v. Volkman, No. CX-00-2035, 
2001 Minn. App. LEXIS 796, at *7 (Minn. Ct. App. July 17, 2001); Price v. County of Suffolk, 
756 N.Y.S.2d 758, 759 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003); Jerome v. A-Best Prods. Co., No. 79139, 2002 
Ohio App. LEXIS1879, at *21 (Ohio Ct. App. April 18, 2002); In re Whiteley, 79 S.W.3d 729, 
735 (Tex. Ct. App. 2002); In re CSX Corp., 124 S.W.3d 149, 153 (Tex. 2003).
156See, e.g., Cal. Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys. v. Coulter, No. 19191-NC, 2004 Del. Ch. 
LEXIS 64, at *3 (Del. Ch. May 26, 2004); Oliver v. Boston Univ., No. 16570-NC, 2004 Del. Ch. 
LEXIS 51, at *10 (Del. Ch. Apr. 26, 2004); In re Fuqua Indus. Inc. Shareholder Litig., No. 
11974, 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 52, at *18-19 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2002); In re Best Lock Corp. 
Shareholder Litig., No. 16281, 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 175, at *15 (Del. Ch. Dec. 18, 2000); 
Marsalis v. Wilson, 778 N.E.2d 612, 618 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002); Wolfington v. Wolfington Body 
Co., 47 Pa. D. & C.4th 225, 242 (Phil. Co. C.P. 2000); In re Ernst & Young,  No. 05-02-00352-
CV, 2002 Tex. App. LEXIS 2986 at *3 (Tex. Ct. App. 2002)
157See, e.g., Ramon v. Aries Ins. Co., 769 So. 2d 1053, 1055 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000); 
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procedurally to criticize discovery requests that the court believes to be broader than the 
allegations of the complaint.159  It also appears when a court overrules a request for more time 
for discovery in opposition to a motion for summary judgment.160  Occasionally, the metaphor is 
also used to distinguish the allowable breadth of discovery under different devices.161
Federal fishing metaphors also occur more frequently in certain types of cases.  The most 
common are actions governed by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act [PSLRA], 
particularly since the legislative history of that Act claims that securities fraud actions often 
“resemble[] a fishing expedition.”162  Some of these cases challenge the sufficiency of the 
pleadings, while others consider a request that the Act’s discovery stay be lifted.163  Cases 
Reusswig v. Erie Ins., 49 Pa. D. & C.4th 338, 346 (Monroe Co. C.P. 2000); In re United Serv. 
Auto. Ass’n, 76 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. Ct. App. 2002).
158See, e.g., Everts v. Salvation Army Harbor Light Multi-Services Ctr., No. C8-02-1728,
2003 Minn. App. LEXIS 696, at *17-18 (Minn. Ct. App. June 10, 2003); Samide v. Roman 
Catholic Diocese, 773 N.Y.S.2d 116, 118 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004)
159See, e.g., Vanvorous v. Burmeister, No. 248450, 2004 Mich. App. LEXIS 1495, at *14 
(Mich. Ct. App. June 15, 2004); Saratoga Harness Racing, Inc. v. Roemer, 711 N.Y.S. 2d 603, 
605 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000); In re United Serv. Auto Ins. Ass’n, 76 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. Ct. 
App. 2002); Texaco, Inc. v. Sanderson, 898 S.W.2d 813, 815 (Tex. 1995).
160See, e.g., Vanvorous, 2004 Mich. App. LEXIS at *14; Rowlette & Assoc. v. Calphalon 
Corp., No. C8-99-1667, 2000 Minn. App. LEXIS 364 at *28 (Minn. App. April 18, 2000).
161Biloff v. Biloff, No. A-99-033, 2000 Neb. App. LEXIS 185 at *17 (Neb. App. June 20, 
2000) (can fish with interrogatories and depositions but not with document production requests); 
Loftin v. Martin, 776 S.W.2d 145 (Tex. 1989) (same).  But see K-Mart Corp. v. Sanderson, 937 
S.W. 2d 429, 431 (Tex. 1996) (rejecting the “notion that any discovery device can be used to 
fish”).
162See, e.g., In re Carnegie Internat’l Corp. Sec. Litig., 107 F. Supp. 2d 676, 679 (D. Md. 
2000), citing S. Rep. 104-98, U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 679, 683 at 14 (1995).  
163See also In re Campbell Soup Co. Sec. Litig., 145 F. Supp. 2d 574, 595 (D.N.J. 2001); 
In re AOL Time Warner, Inc. Sec. & ERISA Litig., MDL Docket No. 1500 All Cases, 2003 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 2731 at *1(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2003); In re Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA 
Litig., No. MDL-1446, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26261 at *30 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2002); Fazio v. 
Lehman Bros., Inc., No. 1:02CV157, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15157 at *1-2 (N.D. Ohio May 16, 
2002); In re Worldcom, Inc. Sec. Master File Litig., 234 F. Supp. 2d 301, 301-02 (S.D.N.Y. 
2002).
40
alleging employment discrimination are also home to cries of “fishing expedition.”164  Cases 
challenging the factual specificity of antitrust allegations produce a number of claims of 
“fishing,”165 as do discovery requests in intellectual property cases.166
In terms of procedural posture, “fishing” claims were most apt to appear in motions 
demanding more detail in pleadings,167 disputes about discovery,168 and in cases involving Rule 
164See, e.g, Adams v. Giant Foods, Inc., 225 F. Supp. 2d 600 (D. Md. 2002) (race 
discrimination); Boyd v. American Airlines, Inc., No. 3-01-CV-2230-D, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
19937 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 17, 2002)(race discrimination); Cooper v. John D. Brush & Co., 242 F. 
Supp. 2d 261 (W.D.N.Y. 2003)(race discrimination); Garcia-Vazquez v. Frito Lay Snacks 
Caribbean, Inc., No. 97-1313(SEC), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1699 (D. P.R. Feb. 16, 2001)(hostile 
work environment); Grayson v. O’Neill, 308 F.3d 808 (7th Cir. 2002)(race discrimination); Hill 
v. Motel 6, 205 F.R.D. 490 (S.D. Ohio 2001)(age discrimination); Munoz v. St. Mary-Corwin 
Hosp., 221 F.3d 1160 (10th Cir. 2000)(age and national origin discrimination); Pedraza v. 
Holiday Housewares, Inc., 203 F.R.D. 40 (D. Mass. 2001)(national origin and perceived sexual 
orientation); Torres v. White, No. 00-4146, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 17953 (6th Cir. Aug. 22, 
2002)(national origin discrimination); Treat v. Garrett County Mem. Hosp., No. AMD 03-1937, 
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25869, at *15 (D. Md. Dec. 23, 2004).
165See, e.g., In re IBM Peripheral EDP Devices Antitrust Litig., 77 F.R.D. 39, 42 (N.D. 
Cal. 1977) (often cited for its colorful statement that even if entitled to embark on a fishing 
expedition, one must at least use “rod and reel, or even a reasonably sized net [; not] drain the 
pond and collect the fish from the bottom”); Network Computing Servs v. Cisco Sys., 223 
F.R.D. 392, 395 (D.S.C. 2004); DJ Mfg. Corp. v. Tex-Shield, Inc., No. 97-1457 (JAG), 2002 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25329 (D.P.R. June 28, 2002); DM Research v. College of American 
Pathologists, 170 F.3d 53, 55 (1st Cir. 1999); Fare Deals, Ltd. v. Glorioso, 217 F. Supp. 2d 670, 
671 (D. Md. 2002).  RICO cases, also disfavored, find similar uses for the fishing metaphor 
when requiring heightened pleading specificity.  See, e.g., Jepson, Inc. v. Makita Corp., 34 F.3d 
1321, 1327 (7th Cir. 1994) (RICO predicate act of mail fraud).
166See, e.g., Automated Tech., Inc. v. Eller, 160 F. Supp. 2d 915 (N.D. Ill. 2001)(theft of 
trade secrets); Moore U.S.A., Inc. v. Standard Register Co., 229 F.3d 1091 (Fed. Cir. 
2001)(patent infringement); Ronald A. Katz Tech. Licensing, L.P. v. Verizon Commun., Inc., 
No. 01-5627, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19691 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 16, 2002)(patent infringement); 
Spring Windows Fashions LP v. Novo Indus., 249 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (W.D. Wis. 2002)(patent 
infringement); Transclean Corp. v. MotorVac Tech., Inc., No. 01-287 (JRT/FLN), 2002 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 19312 (D. Minn. Sep. 30, 2002)(patent infringement).
167See, e.g., DJ Mfg. Corp. v. Tex-Shield, Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 109 (D.P.R. 2002); DM 
Research v. College of Am. Path., 170 F.3d 53, 55 (1st Cir. 1999); Duggan v. Terzakis, 275 F. 
Supp. 2d 968 (N.D. Ill. 2003).
168See, e.g., Abram v. Cargill, No. 01-CV-1656 (JMR/FLN), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7027 
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56(f) motions to allow more discovery before ruling on a motion for summary judgment.169 In 
addition, plaintiffs seeking discovery to find forum contacts that might establish personal 
jurisdiction over defendants, especially foreign nationals, were periodically accused of 
“fishing.”170
Occasionally a contemporary judge will buck the trend and recognize a limited but 
legitimate role for fishing.  Judge Scheindlin, for example, discussed at length the reasons for 
requiring that fraud be pleaded with particularity.  Nevertheless she went on to note:
So-called ‘fishing expeditions’ may not be all bad, however.  For one thing, the threat of 
being sued, even if the plaintiff is still digging for facts, may serve to deter fraud.  
(D. Minn. Feb. 10, 2003); Automated Technologies, Inc. v. Eller, 160 F. Supp. 2d 915 (N.D. Ill. 
2001); Bowen v. Parking Auth. of the City of Camden, 214 F.R.D. 188 (D.N.J. 2003); Boyd v. 
American Airlines, Inc., No. 3-01-CV-2230-D, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19937 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 
17, 2002); Catskill Dev., L.L.C. v. Park Place Entm’t Corp., 206 F.R.D. 78 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); 
Garcel, Inc. v. Hibernia Nat’l Bank, No. 01-0772, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2390 (E.D. La. Jan. 24, 
2002); Higgason v. Hanks, No. 01-4022, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 26263 (7th Cir. Dec. 17, 2002); 
Hill v. Motel 6, 205 F.R.D. 490 (S.D. Ohio 2001); Ignatiev v. United States, 238 F.3d 464 (D.C. 
Cir. 2001); Livingston v. Assoc. Fin. Inc., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86778 (S.D. Ill. June 25, 
2001); McGee v. Hayes, No. 01-7113, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 14803 (10th Cir. July 22, 2002); 
McGrath v. Nassau Health Care Corp., 209 F.R.D. 55 (E.D.N.Y. 2002); Monarch Assurance 
P.L.C. v. United States, 244 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2001); One Thousand Friends of Iowa v. 
Mineta, 250 F. Supp. 2d 1075 (S.D. Iowa 2002); Orleman v. Jumpking Inc., No. 99-2522-CM, 
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11081 (D. Kan. July 22, 2000); Pedraza v. Holiday Housewares, Inc., 
203 F.R.D. 40 (D. Mass. 2001).
169See, e.g., Butler Corp. v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., No. 00-30003-MAP, 2002 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25012 (D. Mass. Dec. 27, 2002); Cooper v. John D. Brush & Co., 242 F. Supp. 
2d 261 (W.D.N.Y. 2003); Dunkin’ Donuts Inc. v. N.A.S.T., Inc., No. 02 C 1272, 2003 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 6179 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 9, 2003); Fare Deals, Ltd. v. Glorioso, 217 F. Supp. 2d 670, 671 (D. 
Md. 2002); Grayson v. O’Neill, 308 F.3d 808 (7th Cir. 2002); Moore U.S.A. v. Standard Registr 
Co., 229 F.3d 1091 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Spring Windows Fashions LP v. Novo Industries, 249 F. 
Supp. 2d 1111 (W.D. Wis. 2002).
170See, e.g., Carefirst of Maryland, Inc. v. Carefirst Pregnancy Centers, Inc., 2003 US. 
App. LEXIS 13443 (4th Cir. July 2, 2003); Metropolitan Antiques & Gems, Inc. v. Beaumont, 
No. 02 CIV. 3937 (DLC), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24679 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 2002); In re Ski 
Train Fire, 230 F. Supp. 2d 392 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 120 F. Supp. 2d 
45 (D.D.C. 2000); Base Metal Trading, Ltd. v. OJSC “Novokuznetsky Aluminum Factory,” 283 
F.3d 208 (4th Cir. 2002).
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Moreover, the balance of harms may tip in favor of a fishing expedition rather than an 
undisclosed fraud.  This may be so, even though the victim of a fishing expedition who 
has not committed any harm is forced to serve as the unwilling fish.171
Judges will also signal acceptance of using discovery in order to fish.  “In short, fishing 
expeditions are permissible, and the discovery statutes must be liberally construed.”172
Despite such occasional holdings, the metaphorical prohibition of fishing expeditions is 
very much alive.  Its original meaning – the limit on discovery to facts supporting one’s own 
case – is dead, although it survives to some extent in the protection of trial preparation materials 
from discovery.173   The types of discovery once rejected as fishing would be accepted without 
controversy under even the narrowest current concepts of discovery.  Pleadings once dismissed 
for fishing would satisfy modern notice pleading requirements.  The concept remains, but the 
line has moved.
The primary function of the fishing metaphor is to express disapproval of a party who is 
thought to have insufficient information to bring, or continue with, a lawsuit.  The fishing 
expedition metaphor now inhabits the center of a crucial policy decision about civil litigation: 
171In re Initial Public Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d 281, 326 n.46 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003).
172FSR Brokerage, Inc. v. Superior Court, No. B156982, 2002 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 
94, at *11 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 16, 2002).  See also Garamendi v. Golden Eagle Ins. Co., 10 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 724, 741 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004); United States v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., No. 99-5 MMS, 
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6925 (D. Del. May 10, 2000) (“Liberal discovery is particularly 
appropriate in a government antitrust suit because of the important public interest involved.”); 
Illinois Coalition Against Handgun Violence v. Illinois Council Against Handgun Violence, No. 
02 C 4130, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3945, at *5 (N.D. Ill. March 18, 2003) (“I allowed the 
Coalition to go on a brief fishing expedition.”).  Accord, 8A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 2206 (19##) (“An objection that a request for 
inspection is a fishing expedition should be given short shrift.  It is true that the party seeking 
discovery must still designate what it wishes to inspect, but all this obstacle means is that the 
would-be angler must have a generalized idea of what kind of fish he or she is hoping to catch.”)
173Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
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where will courts draw the line between rectifying informational imbalance and protecting 
defendants from non-meritorious lawsuits.  The condemnation of fishing has morphed from a 
way of protecting a party’s privacy174 and property rights to protecting parties from the costs of 
litigation.  In an overwhelming majority of cases, the fishing metaphor is used on behalf of 
defendants to limit claims by plaintiffs.
II.  “Fishing Expedition” As Strategy:  The Impact  of Metaphor
A. “Fishing” as a Verbal Attack
One study of ancient metaphorical uses of fishing observes that “the fishing metaphor in 
the prophetic understanding is interchangeable with accounts of literal warfare.”175  Perhaps it 
should not be surprising, then, that it worked its way into the war and sports metaphors used to 
describe the adversary system.  Nor should it be surprising that the metaphor has consistently 
been used as a kind of verbal weapon by those litigants who were opposing litigation or 
discovery.  This tradition goes back to the earliest days of the legal metaphor, where a defendant 
in 1797 was already able to argue that “this is one of those vexatious fishing bills.”176
Instead of just addressing the merits of the dispute (e.g. the discovery request is 
overbroad, compliance would be burdensome, the requested information is not logically 
relevant), the opponent calls it a “fishing expedition.”  In some cases, one can almost hear the 
sneer in the tone of the argument:
$ “If a party, at the instance of his adversary, can be compelled to give his deposition . . . 
174Some “fishing expedition” cases still do concern privacy or property rights.  See, e.g., 
Garcia-Vazquez v. Frito Lay Snacks Caribbean, Inc., No. Civil No. 97-1313(SEC), 2001 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 1699 (D.P.R. Feb. 16, 2001) (protecting certain of plaintiff’s psychiatric records); 
Automated Tech., Inc. v. Eller, 160 F. Supp. 2d 915, 926 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (trade secrets).
175WUELLNER, supra note – at 94.
176Ryves v. Ryves, 30 ER 1044 (1797).
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such a method of preparing for the trial would be tantamount to a fishing excursion for 
evidence to support a doubtful cause.”177
$ “This does not even rise to the dignity of a fishing bill.”178
$ “[D]espite a massive fishing expedition regarding [defendant’s] alleged ‘patterns and 
practices’ concerning the sale of credit life insurance policies, [plaintiff] ultimately failed 
to disclose any pattern or practice witnesses.”179
$ “Plaintiff is attempting to engage in an expensive fishing expedition under the guise of 
further discovery, as Plaintiff has failed to state what facts beyond mere speculation that 
she intends to discover.”180
$ “The plaintiffs Nike and Adidas . . . have extended their deep-pocketed tentacles on a 
fishing expedition in hopes of catching violators.”181
$ “[P]laintiffs are ‘attempting . . . to use discovery as a fishing expedition . . . in the 
desperate hope of finding something to justify their unfounded claim.’”182
Courts are sometimes well aware of the almost-scripted nature of these barbs, noting the 
“familiar designation of professedly indignant respondents, ‘a fishing expedition’”183 or referring 
to the metaphor as “hackneyed and meaningless.”184  Nor does the name-calling always work.185
177Wheeler v. Burckhardt, 56 P. 644, 645 (Ore. 1899) (defendant opposing discovery 
depositions).
178Smith v. Ramsey, 6 Ill. 373, 1844 Ill. LEXIS 40 at **4 (Ill. 1844) (defendant objecting 
to bill of discovery).
179Bostic v. American General Finance, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 2d 611, 613 (S.D.W. Va. 2000) 
(defendant opposing plaintiff’s fee request).
180Madrid v. Chronicle Books, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1236 (D. Wyoming 2002) 
(defendant opposing discovery).
181Nike, Inc. v. Top Brand Company Ltd., 216 F.R.D. 259, 263 (S.D.N.Y. July 3, 2003) 
(defendant opposing sanctions).
182Vacold LLC v. Cerami, 00 Civ. 4024 (AGS), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1589, at *24 
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2001) (defendant opposing plaintiff’s motion to lift discovery stay).
183In re Kevill, 2 N.Y.S.2d 191, 193 (N.Y. Surrogate Ct. 1938).  See also McClatchy 
Newspapers Corp. v. Superior Court, 159 P.2d 944, 950 (Cal. 1945) (referring to the “familiar 
contention that the object is a mere ‘fishing expedition’ through his private papers”).
184SEC v. Oakford Corp., No. 00 Civ. 2426 (JSR)(HBP), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2818, at 
*5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2001).
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In such cases the metaphor may have served only as a distraction, re-routing the discussion from 
the applicable legal test to the question of whether someone is trying to fish.
In other cases, however, the fishing objection, which is tantamount to an accusation of 
bad faith, puts the accused party on the defensive.   If the case is about pleading specificity, it is 
the party seeking heightened detail who should have to show why a departure from Rule 8’s 
notice pleading regime is required.  If the case is about discovery, the party opposing discovery 
has the burden to substantiate its objection by introducing evidence of burden, or privilege, or 
immateriality.186  Instead the rhetorical impact of the cry of “fishing expedition” is to push the 
pleading or discovering party (usually the plaintiff) to justify its actions.  Courts’ words in earlier 
cases, in this context, become ammunition for the verbal attack.187
B. Weak Individual Cases
1. Bad Facts 
Some cases, assuming the court’s opinion fairly describes uncontested facts, seemed 
destined to lose with or without being criticized for “fishing.”  Putting these cases in the 
“fishing” category does not help the resolution of the case itself, and adds weight to the 
185See, e.g., Boutvis v. Risk Mgmt. Alternatives, Inc., No. CIVIL 3:01 CV 1933 (DJS), 
2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8521, at *4 n.2 (D. Conn. May 3, 2002) (“The court further finds that 
defendant’s dismissive description of plaintiff’s discovery requests as an ‘improper fishing 
expedition’ is factually and legally incorrect.”); Rhythm & Hues, Inc. v. Terminal Mktg. Co., 
No. 01 Civ. 4697 (AGS), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10908, at *23 (S.D.N.Y. June 18, 2002); 
Sorensen v. City of New York, No. 98 Civ. 3356 (HB), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 962 (S.D.N.Y. 
Jan. 22, 2003).
186This is true to some extent even in Rule 56(f) cases, in which plaintiffs would have the 
burden to demonstrate how the additional requested discovery would disclose a genuine issue of 
material fact.  In responding to a “fishing” objection they are defending against a claim of 
wrongdoing, not just pointing out the link between the discovery and the issues in the case.
187See text accompanying notes – infra.
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pejorative nature of the metaphor.  One such case is Grayson v, O’Neill,188 a race discrimination 
case brought against the Secret Service by the first African-American to be Special Agent in 
Charge of the Chicago office.  The court began its opinion by noting that the Service “received in 
excess of 100 complaints” against plaintiff Grayson, and that an investigation “revealed that 
Grayson not only intimidated and harassed his own employees, but also solicited favors from the 
public he was charged to protect.”189  In addition, the opinion details numerous specific 
accusations, prefacing them with: “The extent of Grayson’s improprieties cannot be fully 
appreciated without a sampling of his numerous condemnable behaviors.”190
It is not surprising, then, that both trial and appellate courts found that summary judgment 
was proper despite the denial of the plaintiff’s request for discovery regarding Service members’ 
participation in “Good Ole’ Boy Roundups,” which included extremely racist conduct.  Grayson 
argued that white Special Agents in Charge who had participated in such events were not 
disciplined, thus demonstrating that his discipline for misconduct was discriminatory. “Without 
any evidentiary support, his request amounts to nothing more than a fishing expedition and we 
decline to rule that the trial judge abused her discretion in denying Grayson the opportunity to 
extend discovery a fifth time.”191
Does “fishing” add anything to the clarity of the court’s analysis?  No.  The court’s ruling 
turns on a decision that the requested information was not legally relevant.  The court held that 
even if the Roundups could justify an inference of racism in some employees who did not 
supervise Grayson, or even systemic racism on the part of the Secret Service, that evidence 




would not be enough to show that race-neutral reasons for Grayson’s treatment were a pretext.192
2. Bad Lawyering
In a few of the cases in which the fishing metaphor appears, there are indications that the 
result was influenced by poor lawyering on behalf of the losing party.   Using the “fishing” label, 
though, adds an accusation of bad behavior to help justify the court’s belief about the merits.  
Often the problem is failure to aggressively pursue the claim.  One patent case, for example, 
faulted the defendant’s counterclaim:
[D]efendant’s pursuit of these counterclaims has been halfhearted and dilatory.  It 
amended its complaint to add the counterclaims although it could readily have asserted 
them in its original answer.  It has not proceeded promptly to pursue discovery of the 
issue. . . . If defendant wants to justify a fishing expedition it should at least have baited 
its hooks.”193
In another case, several kinds of failure led to the “fishing” complaint.  Whether this was 
poor advocacy, or a lawyer who lacked a good case to argue, is not clear.  In this Title VII hostile 
work environment case, the court considered the plaintiff’s opposition to summary judgment:
Here, plaintiff’s Rule 56(f) affidavit is deficient for several reasons.  First, plaintiff makes 
no attempt to show how the facts sought are reasonably expected to create a genuine 
issue of material fact.  Instead, he states in a conclusory fashion that obtaining the sworn 
statements [of two other African-American employees] is ‘necessary to prove [his] case, 
to show discrimination and an issue of material fact.’  Second, plaintiff has not offered a 
191Id. at 817.  One of the discovery extensions was at the request of the Service.
192The court recited Seventh Circuit law that “[e]vidence of generalized racism directed at 
others is not relevant unless it has some relationship with the employment decision in question.”  
Venters v. City of Delphi, 123 F.3d 956, 973 (7th Cir. 1997).
193Spring Windows Fashions LP v. Novo Industries, 249 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1113 (W.D. 
Wis. 2002).  See also Metropolitan Antiques & Gems, Inc. v. Beaumont, No. 02 CIV. 3937 
(DLC), 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24679, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 2002) (“Nor is Metropolitan 
entitled to discovery to try to develop a factual showing [of personal jurisdiction].  During the 
months between the filing of the motion to dismiss and the plaintiff’s opposition paper, the 
plaintiff did not request the opportunity to take discovery.  Given the inadequate factual and legal 
presentation in Metropolitan’s papers, it would appear that any discovery would be little more 
than a fishing expedition.”).
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reasonable explanation for his failure to obtain this discovery sooner.194
The plaintiff also failed to file a memorandum of law or any other written response in opposition 
to the motion for summary judgment.195  Cumulatively, this convinced the court that plaintiff 
was merely fishing.  Quoting an earlier case, the court stated, “Rule 56(f) discovery is 
specifically designed to enable a plaintiff to fill material evidentiary gaps in its case . . . . [I]t 
does not permit a plaintiff to engage in a ‘fishing expedition.’” 196
3. Lack of Evidence
Other weak individual cases that use the “fishing” metaphor rely on the plaintiff’s 
concession that he lacks evidence.  A California appellate case affirmed the dismissal of the
plaintiff’s discrimination complaint, after discovery, because he “admitted that no one at the 
Bureau or the Department ever made any comments or statements to him about his race, national 
origin, religion, ethnicity, color, or any other category of group bias.  He testified that his claims 
and actions were founded on nothing other than speculation that statistical evidence might prove 
that the Bureau tended to discriminate in its hiring selections.  To the extent plaintiff was 
permitted by the charade of this meritless action to fish in the lake of discovery, his speculations 
were disappointed.”197
194Cooper v. John D. Brush & Co., 242 F. Supp. 2d 261, 266 (W.D.N.Y. 2003) (race 
discrimination hostile work environment case) (noting also that the court had already given 
plaintiff an extension to do this discovery, and plaintiff had failed to do so).  
195Id. at 265.
196Id. at 266, quoting Waldron v. Cities Service Co., 361 F.2d 671, 673 (2d Cir. 1966) 
(Clayton Act case granting summary judgment and refusing continuance for discovery).
197Singh v. Bureau for Private and Post Secondary and Vocational Education, No. 
E030056, 2003 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 502, at *13-14 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 16, 2003) (noting 
that plaintiff Singh had not been hired due to his past serious misconduct as the director of a 
school under defendant Bureau’s jurisdiction).  See also Munoz v. St. Mary-Corwin Hosp., 221 
F.3d 1160, 1169 (10th Cir. 2000) (pointing out that plaintiff doctor had received extensive 
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Other cases are labeled as “fishing” because the court simply doubts that the information 
needed by the plaintiff exists, and therefore denies requests to try to find it.  For example, 
employees sued to recover on an alleged oral promise of additional pay for sales that exceeded a 
quota.  After ruling that the oral contract was unenforceable under the statute of frauds, the court 
dismissed the case despite the plaintiffs’ request try to find letters evidencing the promise in 
company files.  “It is improbable that the files of the defendant contain memoranda or letters 
subscribed by defendant.  It would seem that plaintiffs have no knowledge of any such 
memoranda, but are merely indulging in wishful expectations and are hoping to stave off the 
dismissal of their complaint by applying for an examination and inspection of the defendant’s 
files which would be in the nature of a ‘fishing expedition.’”198 If no signed memorandum exists, 
the court has saved the defendant from the expense of continued litigation.  If it does exist, the 
court has barred the plaintiffs from access to evidence crucial to prove their case.  In neither 
event does use of the fishing metaphor make it more appropriate to cut off discovery.199
negative reviews as an intern that would justify the defendant hospitals’ decision and refusing 
plaintiff’s request for discovery of negative reviews of others over a five year period) (“When, as 
is apparent here, a plaintiff brings an initial action without any factual basis evincing specific 
misconduct by the defendants and then bases extensive discovery requests upon conclusory 
allegations in the hope of finding the necessary evidence of misconduct, that plaintiff abuses the 
judicial process.  Therefore, the magistrate judge appropriately recognized that defendants’ 
compliance was sufficient and the likely benefit of any further attempted fishing expedition 
would be negligible.”)
198McCants v. Emerol Mfg. Co., 81 N.Y.S.2d 770, 771 (Sup. Ct. 1948).  See also Keaggy 
v. Lightcap, 181 A. 474, 475 1935 Pa. LEXIS 736 at ***4 (Pa. 1935) (refusing to order 
discovery and an accounting); Addison v. Allstate Ins. Co., 97 F. Supp. 2d 771, 775 (S.D. Miss. 
2000) (refusing to allow discovery from competitors’ customers to try to show improper steering 
by Allstate).
199See also Higgason v. Hanks, No. 01-4022, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 26263 (7th Cir. 
Dec. 17, 2002) (rejecting plaintiff’s challenge to prison discipline, the court began by 
characterizing plaintiff Higgason as “a frequent litigant in this court,” and refers to the 
“shopworn arguments that we have rejected repeatedly in Higgason’s previous appeals.”  Id. at 
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C. Disfavored Cases – Pleading Facts in Detail
“Fishing expedition” isn’t a form of analysis; it’s code language.  And the code has the 
potential to throw the court’s analysis off track.  Whether headed that way on its own, or directed 
there by a party, courts can end up following lines of “fishing” cases that cast a whole area of 
law in a negative light.  Used often enough, the “fishing” metaphor can affect (or reinforce) the 
bench and bar’s attitude toward certain types of litigation sufficiently to tilt resolution on the 
merits.
1. Early Cases Threatening Family Privacy and Property Rights
In the earliest uses of the metaphor, certain kinds of equity cases were actually labeled as 
“fishing bills.”  The eighteenth century land title cases depicted the plaintiffs as threatening 
property, invading privacy, and disturbing the status quo.  Recall that Lord Chancellor 
Loughborough lamented that “[a] spirit of prying into titles has got into the Court, that is highly 
dangerous to the title of every man in England.”200  Similarly, the fraudulent transfer cases 
involved the somewhat unappealing principle that allowed subsequent creditors to benefit from 
an insolvency that had not affected them – so unappealing that the law would later change to 
include a requirement of actual fraud.201  These “fishing bills” of discovery again threatened the 
party in possession of property and required the disclosure of private information, often to the 
*5).
200Renison v. Ashley, 30 E.R. 724 (1794).  See also BRAY, supra note – at 521 (“Rules 
are laid down for the protection of persons who are in possession of estates to protect them 
against attacks from persons who, hoping to find some blot in their title, sometimes bring actions 
against them without reasonable cause.”); HARE, supra note – at 184 (“It is often of the highest 
importance to the defendant that he be not compelled to disclose documents which relate to the 
property in dispute, for the effect of such a disclosure may be detrimental to that beneficial 
enjoyment of the property to which, as the party in possession, he is entitled.”)
201See, e.g., Clement v. Cozart, 17 S.E. 486 (N.C. 1893) (tracing the development of the 
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detriment of widows and orphans.  The courts were more solicitous of the holders of the assets 
than of the creditors.202  In one case involving an allegation that an insolvent husband had 
wrongfully transferred property to his wife, the court noted the danger involved in allowing such 
inquiries: 
Such a proposition would be a very unjust one to the wife still under the dominion, 
control, and personal influence of the husband.  In receiving favors at his hands, which 
she supposes to be the offerings of affection, or a proper provision for her comfort, she 
would be subjecting that which was her own, or which might afterwards come to her 
from other sources, to unknown and unsuspected charges, of the amount and nature of 
which she would be wholly ignorant.203
In the early days, then, the fishing metaphor was used for certain types of litigation, and 
that litigation was openly limited for policy reasons.  The same is true in contemporary cases, but 
the link is often less open.  Nevertheless, “fishing expedition” claims cluster in certain types of 
controversial cases.
2. Statutory Heightened Pleading Requirements 
Sometimes increased judicial scrutiny is statutorily mandated.  Securities fraud actions 
falling under the PSLRA, for example, require heightened pleading, and discovery is stayed 
during the pendency of a motion to dismiss.204  The Act was designed to discourage litigation 
law regarding subsequent creditors and fraudulent conveyances). 
202Cf. Bankr. R. 2004 (allowing examination of any entity regarding “the acts, conduct, or 
property or to the liabilities and financial condition of the debtor, or to any matter which may 
affect the administration of the debtor’s estate, or to the debtor’s right to a discharge”).  
Bankruptcy courts regularly hold that Rule 2004 examinations may properly be used as “fishing 
expeditions.”  See, e.g., In re Fearn, 96 B.R. 135, 137 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989).
203Huntington v. Saunders, 120 U.S. 78, 81 (1886), quoting Phipps v. Sedgwick, 95 U.S. 
3, 9 (1877).
204In addition, fraud claims have long required that the circumstances of fraud be pleaded 
with particularity.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).  At least in theory, the defendant’s condition of mind can 
be pleaded generally in a fraud case.  Id.  But see Ross v. A.H. Robbins Co., 607 F.2d 545 (2d 
Cir. 1979) (requiring heightened pleading of facts showing Robbins knew its statements were 
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that was seen as speculative, and so the “fishing expedition” metaphor pops up repeatedly.205
Sometimes the courts find the plaintiffs to be fishing, and so dismiss the cases before any 
discovery is allowed.  Other times, particularly when the government has preceded the private 
plaintiffs in investigating the defendant, the courts allow the cases and discovery to proceed.206
But in either case, the metaphor marks “fishing” as the unwanted norm in securities fraud 
litigation.  As the Ninth Circuit noted in approving of one case’s particularized pleadings, “this 
complaint contains sufficient ‘particularity’ and ‘incriminating facts’ to distinguish the 
allegations from the countless ‘fishing expeditions’ which the PSLRA was designed to deter.”207
In disfavored types of litigation, the “fishing expedition” cases feed on each other.  
Courts weave chains of citation to other cases accusing plaintiffs of fishing, so that a kind of 
presumption of bad faith settles over the cause of action generally.  For example, In re Campbell 
Soup Company Securities Litigation208 quotes In re Theragenics Corporation Securities 
Litigation209 for a prohibition on fishing, which in turn cities Parnes v. Gateway 2000210 for its 
false).
205Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 TEX. L. REV. 551, 600 (assumption 
that securities fraud cases frivolous). Determining whether most cases are in fact frivolous 
empirically is very difficult because very few private securities class actions proceed to trial. See
Charles M. Yablon, A Dangerous Supplement? Longshot Claims and Private Securities 
Litigation, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 567, 572 (2000).
206For example, the court in In re AOL Time Warner, Inc. Securities & “ERISA” 
Litigation, No. MDL Docket No. 1500, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2731 at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 
2003), quotes In re WorldCom Inc. Securities Litigation, 234 F. Supp. 2d 301, 306 (S.D.N.Y. 
2002), and in both the plaintiffs secured a partial lifting of the discovery stay to permit access to 
documents already turned over to the executive and legislative branches of government.  Both 
can therefore be absolved: they are not “fishing expeditions.”  See also In re Enron Corp. Sec. 
Litig., No. MDL-1446, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26261, at *31 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2002).
207In re Daou Sys. Inc. Sec. Litig., 411 F.3d 1006, 1024 (9th Cir. 2005).
208145 F. Supp. 2d 574, 594 (D.N.J. 2001).
209105 F. Supp. 2d 1342, 1349 (N.D. Ga. 2000).
210122 F.3d 539, 549 (8th Cir. 1996).
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suspicion of fishing, all in securities fraud cases.   Sometimes the string cites pull in additional
kinds of disfavored cases.  Fishman v. Meinen, a securities fraud case,211 quotes Vicom, Inc. v. 
Harbridge Merchant Services, Inc.,212 a RICO case, which in turn quotes securities cases that 
express fear of strike suits (but not of “fishing”).213
Courts dismissing cases for “fishing” do more than indicate that the plaintiffs lacked 
sufficient factual foundation to meet the pleading requirements.  The metaphor implies that the 
plaintiffs acted irresponsibly and with impure motive.214  Countless PSLRA lawsuits begin by 
having to rebut the “fishing expedition” label, and careful judges have to consciously note that 
the Act “was not enacted to raise the pleading burdens . . .  to such a level that facially valid 
claims, which are not brought for nuisance value or as leverage to obtain a favorable or inflated 
settlement, must be routinely dismissed on Rule 9(b) and 12(b)(6) motions.”215
211No. 02 C 3433, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2527 at *12 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 21, 2003).
21220 F.3d 771, 777 (7th Cir. 1994).  See also Migdal v. Rowe Price-Fleming Int’l, 248 
F.3d 321, 325 (4th Cir. 2001), a suit brought under the Investment Company Act, quoting DM 
Research, Inc. v. College of American Pathologists, 170 F.3d 53, 55 (1st Cir. 1999), a much-
cited antitrust “fishing” case.
213RICO cases, also disfavored, often use the fishing metaphor when requiring heightened 
pleading specificity.  See, e.g., Jepson, Inc. v. Makita Corp., 34 F.3d 1321, 1327 (7th Cir. 1994) 
(RICO predicate act of mail fraud).
214This implication in securities fraud cases seems particularly unfortunate given the 
courts’ serious splits regarding what degree of detail is required and the fact that in many cases 
evidence of intent is in the sole hands of defendant and available only after at least limited 
discovery.  See Fairman, Heightened Pleading, supra note – at 600-612. See also Joseph A. 
Grundfest & A.C. Pritchard, Statutes With Multiple Personality Disorders: The Value of 
Ambiguity in Statutory Design and Interpretation, 54 STAN. L. REV. 627, 634, 674-80 (2002) 
(arguing that the theoretically procedural heightened pleading standard in the PSLRA actually 
has the substantive result of increasing the scienter requirement).
215ABC Arbitrage Plaintiffs Group v. Tchuruk, 291 F.3d 336, 354 (5th Cir. 2002) (noting 
with a “cf.” citation the observation in In re Campbell’s Soup Co. Sec. Litig., 145 F. Supp. 2d 
574, 595 (D.N.J. 2001), that “the PSLRA’s goal [is to] flush[] out suits which are built on mere 
speculation and conclusory allegation and which aim to use discovery as a fishing expedition to 
substantiate frivolous claims”).
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3. Judge-Made Heightened Pleading Requirements 
Other kinds of disfavor are judge-made, and they too find their expression in heightened 
pleading requirements despite the lack of statutory or rule-based justification for requiring 
particularized pleading.  These cases frequently use fishing metaphors.  Private antitrust claims, 
for example, fall into this category.216  Like the securities fraud cases, they often support the 
provenance of their fishing metaphors with reliance on earlier “fishing” cases.   For example, DJ 
Manufacturing Corporation. v. Tex-Shield, Inc.,217 quotes DM Research v. College of American 
Pathologists.218  Similarly,  Network Computing Services v. Cisco Systems,219 quotes In re IBM 
Peripheral EDP Devices Antitrust Litigation for its extended fishing metaphor: “Even if one is 
entitled to embark on a fishing expedition, one must at least use ‘rod and reel, or even a 
reasonably sized net [; not] drain the pond and collect the fish from the bottom.”220   As with the 
securities fraud cases, the fishing label marks antitrust claims as suspect, this time with little 
support for the heightened pleading requirement.
In antitrust cases, courts requiring great factual specificity believed they were authorized 
to do so by a Supreme Court footnote in Associated General Contractors of California v. 
216See, e.g., In re IBM Peripheral EDP Devices Antitrust Litig., 77 F.R..D. 39, 42 (N.D. 
Cal. 1977); Network Computing Servs v. Cisco Sys., 223 F.R.D. 392, 395 (D.S.C. 2004); DJ 
Mfg. Corp. v. Tex-Shield, Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 109 (D.P.R. 2002); DM Research v. College of 
Am. Pathologists, 170 F.3d 53, 55 (1st Cir. 1999); Fare Deals, Ltd. v. Glorioso, 217 F. Supp. 2d 
670, 671 (D. Md. 2002). 
217275 F. Supp.2d 109, 120 (D.P.R. June 28, 2002).
218170 F.3d 53, 55 (1st Cir. 1999).
219223 F.R.D. 392, 395 n.5 (D.S.C. 2004).
22077 F.R.D. 39, 42 (N.D. Cal. 1977).  See also In re Compact Disc Minimum Advertised 
Price Antitrust Litig., 138 F. Supp.2d, 25, 28 (D. Me. 2001), also quoting DM Research, 170 
F.3d at 55.
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California State Council of Carpenters.221  Even after the Supreme Court generally rejected 
judicially-created heightened pleading rules in Leatherman v. Tarrant Co. Narcotics Intelligence 
& Coordination Unit222 and again in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A.,223 heightened pleading 
practice continues to thrive in antitrust cases, aided by the fishing expedition metaphor.224
D. Disfavored Cases – Limiting Discovery Relevance
The “fishing expedition” metaphor in the preceding section reinforced decisions requiring 
greater specificity in pleading.  In other cases, ‘no fishing’ appears as a reason to limit or deny 
discovery.  This is particularly true when the plaintiff’s burden of proof includes establishing 
some level of knowledge or intent by the defendant.  Lacking a ‘smoking gun,’ the plaintiffs in 
these cases seek broad background information to try to establish a pattern of behavior, and 
defendants see such requests as excessive.  Two of the best examples are employment 
discrimination cases and product liability cases.
1. Employment Discrimination
The discovery-related fishing cases often present themselves as issues of discovery 
relevance.  More specifically, they tend to raise issues regarding how similar the object of 
discovery must be to the plaintiff’s claims before the requested information will be discoverable.  
For example, in Pedraza v. Holiday Housewares, Inc., the plaintiff sued his employer, Holiday 
Housewares, for discrimination based on national origin and perceived sexual orientation.  
Holiday Housewares shared a president and management employees with a related company, 
221459 U.S. 519, 528 n.17 (1983).
222507 U.S. 163 (1993).
223534 U.S. 506 (2002).
224See Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 987, 
1011-21 (2003).
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Plastican.  The plaintiff learned during a deposition that at least five lawsuits had been filed 
against Plastican based on national origin or sexual harassment, and asked to take additional 
depositions in order to discover whether those claims were similar to his, either in the identity of 
the accused wrongdoers or in the nature of the allegations, in order to try to establish a pattern 
and practice of discrimination.  The court denied this request, remarking that the plaintiff’s 
motion “bespeaks of a possible fishing expedition into what appear to be largely irrelevant issues 
of discrimination complaints made against a third party.”225
Plaintiffs making claims of discriminatory treatment, as opposed to disparate impact, 
often find their discovery requests rejected as fishing.  In Hill v. Motel 6, 226 an age 
discrimination case, the plaintiff was fired from his position as an area manager.  He asked to 
discover the personnel files of all of Motel 6’s area managers and all complaints or charges of 
age discrimination filed with the government or other agencies.  The court limited discovery to 
employees supervised by the plaintiff’s immediate supervisor.  Otherwise, the court believed it 
would be disturbing “the balance struck between a party’s right to discovery with the need to 
prevent ‘fishing expeditions.’”227 Likewise, the court in Boyd v. American Airlines, Inc.228
limited discovery in a racial harassment and discrimination suit.  The plaintiff requested 
discovery of complaints of racial harassment or racially hostile work environment throughout the 
continental United States, but the court allowed only discovery of the places where the plaintiff’s 
alleged harassment occurred.  The plaintiffs sought the information to rebut the defense that 
American used reasonable care to prevent and correct harassing behavior, by showing the 
225203 F.R.D. 40, 42 (D. Mass. 2001).
226205 F.R.D. 490, 493 (S.D. Ohio 2001).
227Id. at 492, quoting Bush v. Dictaphone Corp., 161 F.3d 363, 367 (6th Cir. 1998).
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company’s responses in other parts of the country.  The court, however, held that “[p]laintiff’s 
request in the instant matter is merely a fishing expedition.”229
As was true with the securities fraud and antitrust cases, “fishing” citations in 
employment discrimination cases build on each other.  In addition to the examples noted above, 
Adams v. Giant Food, Inc.230 quotes an earlier employment case, Morrow v.Farrell.231  The case 
of Pleasants v. Allbaugh,232 which alleged race discrimination in federal employment, quotes 
Hardrick v. Legal Services Corporation, another race discrimination case.233   Decisions in cases 
alleging other types of discrimination also use the strings of “fishing” cases to go beyond 
discussing relevance and imply bad faith.234
2. Products Liability
Products liability cases have similar patterns regarding the types of discovery requests 
that result in accusations of “fishing.”  As in the employment setting, they are relevance issues.  
2282002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19937 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 17, 2002).
229Id. at *4, quoting Spina v. Our Lady of Mercy Medical Center, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
7338, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 7, 2001).  See also Adams v. Giant Foods, Inc., 225 F. Supp. 2d 600, 
607 (D. Md. 2002).  In that case, plaintiffs claimed they were discharged on the basis of race, 
and the employer’s defense was that they had improperly included on their time cards time when 
they were on break or sleeping.  Plaintiffs requested discovery regarding white female employees 
who also falsified time cards, but the court held that it was not discoverable, since the female 
employees – unlike the plaintiffs– were on day rather than night shift and were supervised rather 
than unsupervised.  The court explained that “the purpose of rule 56(f) is not to allow the non-
moving party to engage in a fishing expedition.”  Id.
230225 F. Supp. at 607.
231187 F. Supp. 2d 548, 551 (D. Md. 2002).
232208 F.R.D. 7, 9 (D.D.C. 2002).
23396 F.R.D. 617, 618 (D.D.C. 1983).
234See, e.g., McGee v. Hayes, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 1480, at *8 (10th Cir. July 22, 
2002) (alleging discrimination in the denial of a building permit), quoting Munoz v. St. Mary-
Corwin Hosp., 221 F.3d 1160, 1169 (10th Cir. 2000) (employment discrimination), quoting 
Jarvis v. Nobel/Sysco Food Servs. Co., 985 F.2d 1419, 1423 n. 4 (10th Cir. 1993) (breach of 
duty of fair representation).
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Here they tend to involve disputes about which products are sufficiently similar to the one that 
allegedly injured the plaintiff, or of what time period would be sufficiently material to justify the 
burden of compliance.  The plaintiff in Orleman v. Jumpking235 suffered a spinal cord injury 
while using a Jumpking trampoline, and sued for negligence, strict liability, and breach of 
warranty.  He sought to discover previous lawsuits or claims brought against the defendant as a 
result of trampoline injuries during the past 15 years.  The court narrowed the scope of discovery 
to the make of trampoline on which the plaintiff was injured and “substantially similar” models, 
and to a shorter time period, noting that the generally broad scope of discovery “should not be 
misapplied to allow a fishing expedition in discovery.”236
In the same manner, the Texas Supreme Court narrows discovery in tort cases.  In one, it 
held that a document production request in a workplace toxic tort case for “all documents written 
by defendant’s safety director concerning ‘safety, toxicology, and industrial hygiene, 
epidemiology, fire protection and training’” was too broad, characterizing the original request as 
“an effort to dredge the lake in hopes of finding a fish.”237  Another Texas mass tort case, in 
which 140 plaintiffs claimed asbestos-related injuries, included discovery requests for documents 
about all of defendant’s products.  Because the request included products that the plaintiffs had
not yet claimed to have used, and locations at which the plaintiffs had not worked, the court 
concluded that the plaintiffs’ request “constitute[d] the type of fishing expedition prohibited” by 
2352000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11081 (D. Kan. July 22, 2000).
236Id. at *6, quoting Hofer v. Mack Trucks Inc., 981 F.2d 377, 380 (8th Cir. 1992).  See 
also Anderson v. Farmland Indus., 136 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1195 (D. Kan. 2001).
237Texaco, Inc. v. Sanderson, 898 S.W.2d 813, 815 (Tex. 1995).  See also American 
Medical Sys. v. Osborne, 651 So.2d 209, 211 (Fla. Ct. App. 1995).
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its earlier cases.238
In essence, the courts are deciding, without knowing what discovery would disclose, that 
no reasonable fact finder could rely on the information sought to support the inference the 
plaintiff needs, nor could the discovery reasonably be expected to lead to such evidence.239
Given this presumed low degree of materiality, the court may also be concluding that the burden 
of complying with the discovery request outweighs its probable importance.240  Through the use 
of the fishing metaphor, the court avoids having to explain its reasoning more clearly.  The 
metaphor indicates not only that it finds the logical materiality of the information weak, but also 
that the requests are frivolous or ethically questionable.241 The cases thus become precautionary 
tales warning off those who might argue that the corporate culture of an employer is relevant to a 
claim of discrimination, that a company’s awareness of potential defects in one product might be 
relevant to those in a similar one, or that a company’s knowledge and behavior in one location 
might be relevant to others.
III.  Conclusion
The time-honored cry of “fishing expedition” is still more than capable of preventing 
238In re Am. Optical Corp., 988 S.W.2d 711, 713 (Tex. 1998).  Texas is especially 
enamored of the “fishing expedition” metaphor, and the courts’ string cites reinforce each other.  
American Optical, for example, quotes K Mart Corp. v. Sanderson, 937 S.W.2d 429, 431(Tex. 
1996) (premises liability), Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Hall, 909 S.W.2d 491, 492 (1995) (false 
arrest); and Texaco, 898 S.W.2d at 815 (toxic tort). 
239Cf.  Fed. R. Evid. 401 (evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the 
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or 
less probable than it would be without the evidence.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
240Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(proportionality considerations).
241Two of the employment cases also accuse plaintiffs of trying to “roam in the shadow 
zones of relevancy.”  See Hill v. Motel 6, 205 F.R.D. 490, 493 (S.D. Ohio 2001);  Boyd v. 
American Airlines, Inc., No. 3-01-CV-2230-D, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19937, at *4 (N.D. Tex. 
Oct. 17, 2002).
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discovery and heading off lawsuits.  Metaphorically speaking, fishing expeditions can be 
vexatious,242 massive,243 burdensome,244 expensive,245 classic,246 invasive,247 spurious,248 wide-
ranging,249 transparent,250 blind,251 old-fashioned,252 unbridled,253 or experimental,254 and there is 
the ever-popular “mere fishing expedition.”255  The adjectives serve to highlight, in a colorful or 
dramatic way, the unacceptable behavior of those who fish.  In addition, the metaphor is 
understood to make the objecting parties (and not the information sought) into the hapless fish.  
“[W]hen the fish objects . . .  the fisherman is called upon to justify his pursuit.”256  Fishing is 
clearly a Bad Thing.  
242Ryves v. Ryves, 30 E.R. 1044 (1797).
243Bostic v. American Gen’l Finance, Inc., 87 F. Supp. 2d 611, 613 (S.D.W. Va. 2000).
244EEOC v. Autozone, Inc., 258 F. Supp. 2d 822, 830 (W.D. Tenn. 2003).
245Madrid v. Chronicle Books, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1236 (D. Wyo. 2002).
246Sorensen v. City of New York, No. 98 Civ. 3356 (HB), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 962 at 
*12 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2003).
247Wyoming v. U.S.D.A., 208 F.R.D. 449, 453 (D.D.C. 2002).
248Fare Deals, Ltd. v. Glorioso, 217 F. Supp. 2d 670, 671 (D. Md. 2002).
249Monarch Assurance P.L.C. v. United States, 244 F.3d 1356, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
250Forthmann v. Boyer, 118 Cal. Rptr. 715, 721 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
251Smith v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 113 Cal. Rptr. 399, 418 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001); 
In re Fuqua Indus., Inc. Shareholder Litig., No. 11974, 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 52, at *18-19 (Del. 
Ch. May 2, 2002).
252In re Best Lock Corp. Shareholder Litig., No. 16281, 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 175, at *15 
(Del. Ch. Dec. 18, 2000).
253Saratoga Harness Racing, Inc. v. Romero, 711 N.Y.S.2d 603, 605 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2000).
254Ex parte Brooks, 32 So.2d 534, 608 (Ala. 1947).
255Kelly v. Ingersoll, 1878 Ohio Misc. LEXIS 116 at *2 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1878); Phalen v. 
Roberts, 21 A.D. 603, 604 (N.Y. App. Div. 1897); Newkirk v.Willett, 2 Johns. Cas. 413, 1800 
N.Y. LEXIS 168 (1800); Phillips v. Curtis, 75 N.Y.S. 551, 554 (1902); Continental Bank of N.Y. 
v. Myerle, 29 A.D. 282, 285 (N.Y. App. Div. 1898); Terry v. Stull, 169 A. 739, 741 (Del. Ch. 
1933); Landry v. Ozenne, 195 So. 14, 19 (La. 1940); State ex rel Laughoin v. Sartorious, 119 
S.W.2d 471, 473 (Mo. Ct. App. 1938); Addison v. Allstate Ins. Co., 97 F. Supp. 2d 771, 774, 
775 (S.D. Miss. 2000).
256Patterson v. Burge, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1331 at *5 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 5, 2005), quoting
Northwestern Mem. Hosp. v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 923, 931 (7th Cir. 2004).  See also In re Initial 
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On those rare occasions in which courts let fishing go forward, their tone is one of 
permission, not praise.  A fishing expedition can be “permissible,” or “justifiable,”257 or 
“appropriate.”258  Even the drafters of the federal discovery rules did not create a linguistic 
system in which fishing is desirable.  Instead they criticized the former use of the metaphor.259
Nowhere do we find cases praising “skillful fishing expeditions” or “thorough fishing 
expeditions” or “creative fishing expeditions” or “laudable fishing expeditions.”
Over the centuries, the fishing metaphor in law has both changed and stayed the same.  
The kinds of acts condemned as fishing have changed dramatically.  Lawsuits no longer require 
detailed fact pleading demonstrating that the pleader already has all necessary evidence.  
Discovery is no longer limited to a party’s own case, or to the admission of specific information, 
or to the production of identified documents.  Yet the image of the overreaching or unscrupulous 
possibility of fishing remains, harking back to an older way of looking at pleadings and 
discovery.
The fishing metaphor is at best a distraction.  Its uses are too tired and formulaic to add 
new insight in judicial opinions or commentary.  Describing the U.S. civil litigation system as 
one that foolishly allows “fishing” is a harmful caricature.260 As a pervasive legal metaphor, 
though, it structures the way we think when we consider what it means to file a lawsuit and to 
request information needed to prove the claims in a lawsuit. Can the legal system instead reclaim 
Public Offering Sec. Litig., 241 F. Supp. 2d 281, 326 n.46 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
257In re Merkle, 19 P. 401, 401, 1888 Kan. LEXIS 223 at ***2 (Kan. 1888).
258U.S. v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., No. 99-5 MMS, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6925, at * 13-14 
(D. Del. May 10, 2000).
259See text accompanying notes – supra.
260See Stephen N. Subrin, Discovery in Global Perspective: Are We Nuts?, 52 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 299, 301-09 (2002).
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the positive side of fishing?
Such an effort might begin by getting more serious about the nature of literal fishing.  
Whether one fishes for a living or for sport, fishing is a targeted activity.  Those who fish go to 
places known to have fish, use bait tailored to the expected fish, and techniques designed to 
maximize the quality and quantity of the catch.  People fish for a living, and the ones who 
succeed blend knowledge, hard work, and skill.  Devotees of fly fishing would go further, and 
claim that fishing blends skill and art, involving “a sixth sense that takes human effort to a higher 
plane.  To Think Like a Fish (and therefore know where to find one) is a gift of cultivated 
instinct . . . The mind is like a computer crammed with so many fish facts that it suddenly 
produces an insight that depends on those facts but leaps beyond them.”261  Perhaps a focus on 
the informed targeting, talent, and art involved in fishing could help to neutralize the metaphor.
Even speaking metaphorically, the concept of fishing is not invariably negative outside 
the legal context.  Christian scriptures describe Jesus as instructing his followers to become 
“fishers of people.”262  Literature contains positive uses of metaphorical fishing.  For example, 
John Donne in The Bait portrays his lover as a skilled fisher:
Let others freeze with angling reeds,
And cut their legs with shells and weeds,
Or treacherously poor fish beset,
With strangling snare, or windowy net . . . 
For thee, thou need’st no such deceit,
For thou thyself art thine own bait:
That fish, that is not catch’d thereby,
261Holly Morris, Fumbling After Grace: Fishing and Writing, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 1997, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/books/97/06/08/bookends/bookend.html.
262Matthew 4:19; Mark 1:17; Luke 5:10 (“halieis anthropon” in Greek).  Consider also 
T.S. Eliot’s complex use of the figure of the Fisher King in The Wasteland.
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Alas! is wiser far than I.263
Virginia Woolf in A Room of One’s Own used fishing as a metaphor for thinking.264 A recent 
popular novel used fishing (along with hunting) to represent the heroine’s “spirited search for 
true love, self-understanding, and a fulfilling career.”265
Everyday speech is also more neutral than the legal uses.  Metaphorical fishing belongs 
to a larger metaphoric system which portrays a problem as a body of water, and trying to solve
the problem is looking for an object in water.   So, for example, investigating a problem is 
exploring water (“He dived right into the problem”); the solution is an object in water (“The 
answer’s just floating around out there”); and difficulty in solving is difficulty in exploring water 
(“The murky waters of the investigation frustrated him”).266  Fishing, in this system, is just an 
attempt to solve the problem: “He’d been fishing for the answer for weeks.”    This usage 
appears in many contexts.  For example, job hunting or dating is described as “fishing,” with a 
good result being a “good catch” or “landing” a good job.267 “The one that got away” is 
generally seen as a desirable and legitimate object of pursuit.  Seen in this light, fishing is not 
subversive or underhanded, but the process of finding an answer.  A few of the legal metaphors, 
when describing the activities of lawyers, have this more neutral tone.  Lawyers attempt to fill 
263
 John Donne, The Bait, I POEMS OF JOHN DONNE 47 (E.K. Chambers, ed. 1896).
264Virginia Woolf, A ROOM OF ONE’S OWN 5 (1929) (“Thought . . . had let its line down 
into the stream.”).
265 MELISSA BANKS, THE GIRLS’ GUIDE TO HUNTING AND FISHING (1999), reviewed by 
ReadingGroupGuides.com, at
http://www.readinggroupguides.com/guides/girls_guide_to_hunting_and_fishing.asp (last visited 
Feb. 2, 2006).
266George Lakoff, A Problem is a Body of Water, at
http://cogsci.berkeley.edu/lakoff/metaphors/A_Probem_Is_A_Body_Of_Water (1994), last 
visited Feb. 2, 2006.
267
 Tameria Guide for Writers, Figurative Speech, at
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their baskets,268 bait their hooks,269 and cast their lines.270
It takes a collective act of will to change the impact of metaphor, if in fact change is 
possible.271   If we continue to think of certain litigative acts as fishing, we need the image of the 
skilled, artful, efficient fisher, looking for the right things in the right places.  The image would 
be not a “dragnet”272 but a skillful cast, and the issue not whether parties are fishing but how well
they fish.  “Catching” information demonstrating that a cause of action exists would be a 
beneficial way of enforcing legal norms rather than a disfavored transaction cost.  Stripped of its 
pejorative slant, fishing would become a neutral concept rather than a prohibited act.  In this way 
it might become a fairer arbiter in the difficult task of deciding which cases go forward.
Far better, though, would be the removal of the “No Fishing” sign from the shores of 
legal discourse.  As Hickman noted back in 1947, it is a “time-honored cry” and too deeply 
planted in our collective consciousness to be easily transformed to “Fisherfolk Welcome.”  
While the metaphor may have started “as a device to liberate thought,” it has ended by 
“enslaving it.”273  It’s time for the fishing metaphor – with its uncatchable fish – to swim away to 
inaccessible waters, never to be heard from again.
http://www.tameri.com/edit/figurative.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2006)
268Phalen v. Roberts, 21 A.D. 603, 604 (N.Y. App. Div. 1897).
269Spring Windows Fashions LP v. Novo Industries, 249 F.Supp. 2d 1111, 1113 (W.D. 
Wis. 2002).
270Marsalis v. Wilson, 778 N.E.2d 612, 618 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002).  Cf.  Walter v. Walter, 
127 S.W.3d 396, 398 (Tex. App. 2004) (“Although appellant is a licensed attorney, a law license 
is not a fishing license.”).
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 “Rather than a wholly new metaphor, cognitive theory . . . suggests ways to re-view a 
current metaphor.”  Berger, supra note – at 207.
272Benbow v. Aspen Tech., Inc., No. 02-2881, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17936, at *11 
(E.D. La. Oct. 7, 2003).
273 Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58, 61 (N.Y. 1926) (Cardozo, J., rejecting the 
metaphor of a “parent” corporation’s liability due to acting through an “alias” or “dummy” 
65
subsidiary).
